Final Report



QPS Violent Confrontations Review

Prepared by the QPS Violent Confrontations Review Team, Operational Capability Command

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List of Abbreviations

AAO: Active Armed Offender ANZCOPP: Australia New Zealand Council of Police Professionalisation ANZPAA: Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency BOM: Board of Management **CIM: Crisis Intervention Model** Comco: Communication Coordinators COPS: Consider All Options Practice Safety **CRO:** Communication Room Operators CTG: Counter Terrorism Group DDO: District Duty Officer **DPM: Divisional Performance Management** ESC: Ethical Standards Command ET: Education & Training FRO: First Response Officer HRDB: Human Resource Development Branch ICMC: Intelligence, Counter Terrorism and Major Events Command ICS: Incident Command System IINRS: Incident/injury Notification and Reporting System LU: Litigation Unit MHIP: Mental Health Intervention Program MHLO: Mental Health Liaison Officers **OCC: Operational Capability Command OPM: Operational Procedure Manual ORAS: Operational Research Advisory Section ORAU: Operational Research and Advisory Unit OSTT: Operational Skills and Tactics Training** PB: Program Board PCC: Police Communication Centres PEAC: Police Education Advisory Council PERF: Police Executive Research Forum PMO: Program Management Office PPRA: Police Powers & Responsibilities Act 2000 **PPSM: Police Practice Standards Model** PSBA: Public Safety Business Agency QCAD: QPS Computer Aided Dispatch QCCC: Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission QFTAC: Queensland Fixated Threat Assessment Centre **QH: Queensland Health QPS: Queensland Police Service RDO: Regional Duty Officer** SEMS: Significant Event Message System SERP: Significant Events Review Panel SMHC: Senior Mental Health Clinician SSG: Specialist Services Group UOF: Use of Force WIN: What's Important Now?

1. Executive Summary and Recommendations

1.1 Executive Summary

In late November 2014 following four fatal police shootings the Queensland Commissioner of Police acknowledged potential community concern around police shootings. He announced an immediate review of policy, procedures and training involving incidents that may lead to a violent confrontation between individuals and police. The Queensland Police Service (QPS) Ethical Standards Command (ESC) is presently investigating the five fatal police shooting incidents from 2013 and 2014 on behalf of the State Coroner with oversight by the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission (QCCC). The Commissioner was clear in his expectation that this QPS review would be independent of those coronial processes, however was quick to identify the need for the Service to take immediate steps to review processes and take action where necessary.

A Steering Committee comprised of representatives from the QCCC, QPS, Public Safety Business Agency (PSBA) and academia was formed to establish the terms of reference and overview the review process. A reference group including internal and external stakeholders provided further guidance to progress the review. The review has focused on answering two key questions:

- What is the role of the QPS in the prevention of violent confrontations? And
- Can the QPS response to violent confrontations once they occur be improved?

The review took a systematic approach, being guided by an analysis of current national and international best practice and research in police use of force (UOF), social science, criminological and psychological literature. Using a mixed methodology, interviews with key internal and external stakeholders, analysis of UOF reporting data, surveys with frontline supervisors and analysis of relevant legislation, policies and procedures were the primary data sources.

Police are often the 24/7 first responders called to diffuse a situation involving a person in crisis in the community and this review acknowledges that interactions between police and members of the public can instantaneously escalate to violent confrontation, in some cases immediately upon the arrival of officers. On these occasions officers must act instinctively, in accordance with the law and their training to protect life. This review concentrates on identifying circumstances where enhanced information sharing, communication, planning and de-escalation techniques can maximise the opportunities to decrease or eliminate the need for police to use force.

The review also found that nearly half (45%) of all police shootings between 2000 and 2014 involved QPS members shooting at moving vehicles and that there is ambiguity between the OPM, the QPS Traffic Manual and the governing legislation. In addition to the current policy being equivocal, it was identified that the QPS does not consistently train police where to position the police vehicle and how to respond when threatened by an oncoming moving vehicle.

The literature review identified the complications in dealing with people in crisis who present with mental health issues and substance abuse problems, finding that Health agencies will also utilise physical and medicinal means to restrain a patient whose behaviour they cannot be de-escalate or call for police assistance.

The QPS has a number of existing strategies in place for information sharing with other agencies, however there is still a need to enhance these measures through further inter-departmental agreements. Several QPS initiatives meet current national and international best practice in prevention, early intervention and case management, for example the Queensland Fixed Threat Assessment Centre (QFTAC), which assesses and case manages fixated persons who pose a risk to Public Office Holders. The QPS Mental Health Intervention Program (MHIP) involves preventative

cross agency collaboration with health agencies to case manage at risk people identified through repeat calls for service.

In 2013 the funding, strategic governance and the QPS state co-ordinator role for the MHIP transitioned to the PSBA, the residual operational responsibility remained with the QPS via a network of Regional and District Mental Health Liaison Officers (MHLO). The review observed an uncoordinated approach across the QPS in the application of the MHIP and found differing early intervention models operating with MHLOs in various locations across the state. The lack of a coordinated approach and the absence of any formal evaluation of these models makes it difficult to measure whether the services are being delivered within a best practice framework.

The review found that current policy, procedures and training provide sound foundations for preventing and responding to violent confrontations and the Incident Command Unit, Operational Skills Training Unit and the State Negotiator Unit provide specialised but siloed training in communication, operational skills training and incident command techniques. However the literature supports that these types of training should be integrated, the review found that a global Use of Force curricula would provide greater synergy across all Use of Force policy, procedures, curriculums and training. The QPS Situational Use of Force Model also aligns with current national best practice guidelines but the relevant QPS policy is fragmented and located in various sections of the Operational Performance Manual (OPM). The underpinning UOF philosophy *'minimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident'* is not prominently situated within the OPM.

Additionally, there is no clear definition in policy relating to situational containment, de-escalation, tactical withdrawal as a sub set of de-escalation and limited guidance is provided on how an officer is to obtain these states. The model and guiding policy and procedures are focused on the point of engagement with a subject with little emphasis on planning the approach. Planning for an incident is articulated in a different chapter of the OPM - Chapter 1 (Incident Command), which outlines the need for officers to develop Incident Action Plans to achieve one or more of a range of objectives: Isolate, Contain, Evacuate, Negotiate, Resolve, Investigate, Rehabilitate, Evaluate, and are collectively known by the acronym ICENRIRE. To illustrate the importance of integrating planning into a police response the review team developed a proposed model that better encapsulates best practice through the amalgamation of both the QPS situational UOF model and the ICENRIRE principles (Appendix B). The model highlights the integral contribution of police communications rooms in any police response.

Good communication is still the corner stone of contemporary policing, however the review found communication does not feature as a discrete meaningful assessment item at police recruit applicant level, nor as a specific element of ongoing training across an officer's career. Communication skills are part of the annual OSTT use of force training. However the emphasis is strongly focussed on aggressive tactical communication at the point of crisis and typically immediately before the application of UOF, rather than more peaceable conflict resolution skills. Considering the importance of interpersonal skills required for an operational officer this is an issue of concern. Best practice within the organisation was identified in the QPS-delivered First Response Officer (FRO) training program, which provides dynamic scenarios for officers to practice de-escalation communication skills when dealing with persons suffering from a mental illness. This package is presently only provided by MHLO's and teams of police negotiators to First Year Constables within police regions.

Further concerns with police training were highlighted, specifically a lack of visibility by QPS over curriculum development which is currently the responsibility of the Public Safety Business Agency. This concern must be addressed given the Service owns the risk/liability of ensuring officer actions are lawful. The review also found a siloed approach to curriculum development and training delivery without external oversight and validation.

Throughout the review it was apparent that there is a lack of emphasis placed on using and recording of UOF options at the lower end of the force spectrum. It is also evident in OST training, where greater emphasis is placed on higher level UOF options (baton, Taser, firearm), with little or no ongoing training in non-aggressive tactical communication, planning or de-escalation strategies. QPS UOF reporting does not have provision to record matters resolved utilising the lower end UOF methods and UOF reporting is often arduous for police to attend too. Consequently the QPS is not well positioned to identify how its members frequently resolve violent confrontations.

The importance of information sharing, including intelligence holdings from the moment a call for service by the community or police is received was highlighted. Currently there is little clarity of the role and responsibility for call handlers in police communication centres (PCC) or the extent to which they contribute to a command and control function of an incident. There is no governance and limited assessment tools in place in PCC's with resource allocation premised on what police resource is next available. The provision of accurate timely information to first responders is also problematic, with QPS data holdings being complex and disparate compounded by a lack of relevant training in data extraction for PCC call handlers.

One of the roles of the PCC operators is to establish and improve the 'situational awareness' of operational police at incidents. There are currently two bodies of work being undertaken concurrently within the Service to address this issue; the development of an improved service-wide command and control doctrine and a review of the training of PCC staff including the role of the PCC in the management of significant events. To ensure consistency of approach it would be a more efficient use of resources to amalgamate both bodies of work to develop best practice policy and guidelines.

The role played by supervisors in the mentoring and development of subordinate officers and the importance of frontline supervision in relation to UOF and violent confrontations is crucial. The review found tensions between intent and practice regarding operational supervision, with many shift supervisors being tasked to attend to primarily administrative functions, rather than being on-road supervision. In addition there is no difference in the key accountabilities outlined in the current position descriptions for a general duties senior constable and a general duties shift sergeant, and there is no mention of the word 'supervision' anywhere in the sergeant profile.

Other findings of relevance relate to the lack of a comprehensive or holistic UOF data collection system within the Service and that organisational research and evaluation capacity across the Service is severely limited, with this function having transferring to PSBA. Only one section within PSBA currently has responsibility for operational research and evaluation, Operational Research and Advisory Section (ORAS) which is staffed by one person. This has also impacted the capacity of the QPS Significant Events Review Panel to undertake trend analysis and research of best practice, limiting its effectiveness. Considering the importance of practice being informed by a strong evidence base, this is something which needs to be addressed.

Police shootings, whilst tragic and traumatic events for those directly impacted and the wider community in general, are rare in occurrence, accounting for only a very small proportion of the overall number of interactions police have with the public. These critical incidents are complex and often occur in a dynamic, constantly changing environment. In reporting these findings, the review team acknowledges that whilst our existing UOF model aligns with best practice, there are some gaps and tensions between QPS policy, procedure and training. However, as an organisation strongly committed to continuous improvement we welcome the opportunity to enhance our operational response to all incidents to better meet the needs of our community

As part of QPS commitment to preventing and enhancing responses to violent confrontations and to continuous improvement, several new initiatives have commenced since November 2014:

- Cross agency information sharing involving high risk mental health related incidents has been enhanced through the co-location of a Senior Mental Health Clinician (SMHC) within the Brisbane PCC who provides information and advice to responding police during high calls for service periods. The initiative has dealt with over 600 referrals over the past eight months with improved outcomes through information sharing.;
- Upgrading of the QPS Intranet Officer Safety Portal, to enhance the timely information available to all police on high risk people and possible risks and triggers associated with approaching them;

- Education and Training, Public Safety Business Agency is reviewing OSTT curriculum, informed partially by this review. A mandatory on-line computer training product on Use of Force (UOF), to be completed prior to attending OSTT has been implemented;
- QPS Program Board (PB) resolved that the future direction of UOF policy decisions will be overseen RPB who will make recommendations to the QPS Board of Management (BOM);
- 318 additional Tasers have been made available for use by operational staff;
- Planned workshops with stakeholders, Queensland Health and the Mental Health Commissioner;
- QPS Health and Safety Committee are progressing a review of First Aid Training for QPS members;
- An external critique of scenario based OSTT by the steering committee, reference group and members from the Mental Health Commission with their feedback incorporated into this review;
- A trial of a Case and Place integrated service delivery strategy which identifies repeat calls for service and applies preventative strategies is underway in the Logan, Mt Isa, Wide-Bay and Darling Downs Districts;
- A trial in the Brisbane Region by team members attached to the Public Safety Response Team (PSRT) commenced in July 2015. The Mobility Response Capability (MRC) Teams are deployed in a first response capacity, primarily as a defensive platform. The trial involves deploying small teams of four with extra less lethal options such as crowd control shields, pepper balls, larger OC spray, ballistic helmets and crowd control armour to potential violent confrontations.

1.2 Recommendations

Information sharing

<u>Recommendation 1:</u> That the Executive Director QPS Legal Division, the Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command, the Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command and the General Manager Frontline Digital Services, PSBA collaboratively explore opportunities to improve facilitation of information sharing across QPS, government agencies and service providers including-

- real-time information sharing between QPS and Queensland Health with a view to improved prevention and responses to persons reaching crisis point, including when UOF has been utilised by police for an Emergency Examination Order (EEO); and
- update the existing Mental Health Collaboration Memorandum of Understanding and QPS policy to include real-time information mechanisms

Case management

<u>Recommendation 2</u>: The Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command give consideration to-

- revitalising the Mental Health Intervention Project; and
- developing and co-ordinating delivery of annual mental health training for all operational police, including collaboratively exploring with Executive Officer Education and Training PSBA opportunities to improve facilitation by integration with the OSTT Unit; and
- consider whether mental health training (including FRO training) should be embedded into annual OST Training; and
- re-establishing the QPS Mental Health State Coordinator position to monitor, support and give guidance to the regional and district network of Mental Health Liaison Officers; and
- appointing a QPS Domestic and Family Violence State Co-ordinator Liaison to monitor, support and give guidance to the regional, district and station network of Domestic Violence Liaison Officers and Co-ordinators.

<u>Recommendation 3:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command direct work be undertaken in collaboration with Queensland Health to formulate an evidence-based framework to underpin the early intervention initiatives such as the Crisis Intervention Teams currently utilised across the State. This should include-

- findings from a formal evaluation of the existing crisis intervention teams being trialled under the Mental Health Intervention Project; and
- the role of intelligence/information gathering in crisis intervention models; and
- a framework for developing crisis intervention plans (CIP)'s for relevant individuals; and
- the development of a training package for police on CIP's

<u>Recommendation 4:</u> The Assistant Commissioner of Community Contact Command and the Assistant Commissioner Intelligence, Counter Terrorism and Major Events Command collaborate with Queensland Health to explore-

- extending the Queensland Fixed Threat Assessment Centre (QFTAC) principles to more than just Public Office Holders, identifying persons involved in domestic violence at risk of escalating to a crisis point, (for example rejected stalking and homicide); and
- working with QFTAC members to identify a risk matrix or base line indicators for domestic violence that predicts further victimisation for use by QPS members

Philosophy

<u>Recommendation 5:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command in conjunction with Executive Officer Education and Training PSBA direct work to ensure-

- the QPS statement "*minimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident*" is clearly identified as being the QPS use of force philosophical statement underpinning all policy, procedure, Operational Skills and Tactics Training curriculum development and training; and
- clarification is provided as to the current requirement for use of the terms 'high risk' and 'unknown risk' in training having regard the current threat assessment tools, POP, COPS and WIN also currently outlined in QPS policy.

Policy & Procedure

<u>Recommendation 6:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command continue directing work to progress the QPS Operational Procedure Manual to integrate all relevant use of force and incident management policy and procedures into a single, cohesive section or chapter to better reflect the necessary synergy between planning and responses to an incident. Including placing the UOF philosophical statement in a more prominent position in Chapter 14 of the OPM.

<u>Recommendation 7:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command in conjunction with the Executive Officer Education and Training PSBA collaborate to ensure-

- the current QPS situational use of force model in policy is enhanced to illustrate the need for an integrated response incorporating planning and the elements of Isolate, Contain, Evacuate, Negotiate, Resolve, Investigate, Rehabilitate, and Evaluate (ICENRIRE) to all police incidents (Appendix B); and
- best practice definitions of tactical withdrawal, situational containment, de-escalation and 'planning the approach' are identified and that chapter 14.3 OPM is amended with their inclusion.

Police shooting at vehicles

<u>Recommendation 8:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command direct a review of section 14.7 of the Operational Procedure Manual and section10.7.2 of the QPS Traffic Manual to -

- remove ambiguity and clearly articulate the circumstances in law when an officer would be justified in shooting at a moving vehicle; and
- ensure that the policy is restrictive in nature; and reflective of the legislation; and
- include reference to a duty of care regarding the foreseeable risk associated with any loss of control of the vehicle subsequent to police shooting at it.

<u>Recommendation 9:</u> The Deputy Commissioner Strategy, Policy and Performance, in conjunction with the Deputy Chief Executive Officer PSBA direct work be undertaken to-

- permanently embed training on 'not shooting' at vehicles as a fundamental element of the OSTT curriculum annually; and
- ensure the training adequately addresses the appropriate positioning of vehicles; and
- assess whether a computer based training product to be introduced in the 2016 OSTT curriculum adequately addresses the issue of police 'not shooting' at vehicles;

<u>Recommendation 10:</u> The Commissioner of Police considers impressing upon the QPS Executive Leadership Team to consistently and actively message that the QPS policy on 'not shooting at moving vehicles' is restrictive.

Curriculum development and oversight

<u>Recommendation 11:</u> The Deputy Commissioner Strategy Policy and Performance, in conjunction with the Deputy Chief Executive Officer PSBA oversee the realignment of police training to ensure-

- as the user of training the QPS is the primary decision maker regarding curriculum development; and
- the development of an on-going evidence based governance process that informs the evolution of training and methodology.

<u>Recommendation 12:</u> The Deputy Commissioner Strategy, Policy and Performance, in conjunction with the Deputy Chief Executive Officer PSBA, the Assistant Commissioner Operations Support Command and the Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command direct collaborative work be undertaken on UOF curriculum development and training delivery service-wide to-

- identify an overarching strategic framework that ensures the quality and consistency of all UOF officer training and OSTT instruction state-wide; and
- establish whether a global curricula for UOF training would ensure quality and consistency; through ongoing integration and collaboration between State Negotiator Unit (OSC), OST Unit (PSBA), Incident Command Unit (PSBA), MHLO Co-Ordinator (CCC); and
- evaluate the current structure, sequencing and 'down time' of the existing blocks of OST training to identify efficiencies where training could be enhanced; and
- evaluate the capability of the current OST instructor cohort to establish if they have the capability to deliver the integrated training; and
- ensure further collaboration between State Negotiator Unit (OSC), OST Unit (PSBA), Incident Command Unit (PSBA) and MHLO Co-Ordinator (CCC) to develop an integrated training package to be delivered to the OST instructor cohort

<u>Recommendation 13:</u> The Deputy Commissioner Strategy, Policy and Performance, in conjunction with the Deputy Chief Executive Officer PSBA consider the establishment of a suitable body (similar to PEAC) to provide advice and external oversight of curriculum development and training delivery.

Communication

<u>Recommendation 14:</u> The General Manager Human Resources, PSBA include in the current recruiting review the implementation of a core communication component to specifically assess applicants' interpersonal and conflict resolution skills.

De-escalation

<u>Recommendation 15:</u> The Executive Officer Education and Training PSBA direct work be undertaken to ensure that the Operational Skills and Tactics Training program learning outcomes permanently encapsulate a balance of all use of force options in learning outcomes with a greater emphasis on-

- planning the approach (including vehicle placement), communication and de-escalation; and
- that the findings from the QPS recipients of the 2015 Suncorp Scholarship (State Negotiators Unit) currently exploring de-escalation best practice are considered in the curriculum development.

Rendering assistance (first aid)

<u>Recommendation 16</u>: The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command and the General Manager, H.R. PSBA direct the outcomes of work currently being undertaken within QPS and PSBA in relation to first aid training for in-service police is used to inform future development of relevant policy, procedures and training by January 31, 2016.

Calls for service

<u>Recommendation 17:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command and the Assistant Commissioner of Operational Capability Command collaborate with the Executive Officer Education and Training PSBA to ensure an integrated response to the projects relating to command and control and management of significant incidents to-

- ensure outcomes achieved are cohesive and reflect current best practice; and
- identify and baseline UOF training, incident management and information sharing principles for sworn and unsworn members in keeping with their role in policing responses (highlighted in Appendix B). Including PCC staff and supervisors participating in incident command training and multijurisdictional exercises; and
- identify opportunities to improve communications room processes including risk assessment frameworks that identify critical information to disseminate to operational police, will enhance the situational awareness of operational police and enhance outcomes of violent confrontations involving police, (considering the proposed changes in Appendix D);.and
- ensure the command and control doctrine is integrated into OST training.

Dissemination of critical information

<u>Recommendation 18:</u> That the Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command consider applying a procedure in Police Communications Centres that ensures preference is given to using encrypted police radio rather than mobile phones to convey critical information to all attending police.

Intelligence and information sharing

<u>Recommendation 19:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Major Events Command collaborate with the Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command giving consideration to ways in which the level of operational support provided to officers responding to incidents may be enhanced through-

- exploring whether PCC staff require enhanced training on information gathering from computer holdings; and
- intelligence officers monitoring police radios, CAD or being embedded in Police Communication Centres to provide first responders with immediate access to intelligence gathered information.

<u>Recommendation 20:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Major Events Command and the Assistant Commissioner Community Contact collaborate with the Assistant Commissioner Operations Support Command (State Negotiator Unit) to explore a model to trial where negotiator and intelligence capabilities are embedded in BPCC to provide state-wide support 24/7.

<u>Recommendation 21:</u> The General Manager Frontline Digital Services, PSBA direct work be undertaken to review and fast track the inclusion of the Tactical Police Table application on the approved list of downloadable apps for QPS issues iPads.

Police call centre Mental Health Clinician initiative

<u>Recommendation 22:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command in partnership with Queensland Health coordinate a full evaluation of the BPCC / SMHC initiative and ensure findings from the evaluation are used to inform further initiative development.

Operational supervision and leadership

<u>Recommendation 23:</u> The Deputy Commissioner, Regional Operations in partnership with the Executive Director, Human Resources PSBA direct work be undertaken to-

• determine and clearly articulate QPS requirements of shift supervisors specifically including reference to planning and managing the response to violent confrontations in the relevant position descriptions and key accountabilities; and

• ensure the requirements are reinforced through clear messaging across the QPS.

Use of force reporting

<u>Recommendation 24</u>: The Assistant Commissioner Ethical Standards Command and Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command in conjunction with the Chief Information Officer PSBA direct work be undertaken to enhance organisational data systems to enable simplistic and comprehensive use of force data collection including-

 a review of how communications room operators could utilise the QCAD and QPRIME interfaces to record all Situational Use of Force options employed by police and the level of subject resistance (for example weapons possessed) including matters resolved without injury or current non-reportable use of force.

Operational research and advisory section

<u>Recommendation 25:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command in consultation with the General Manager Human Resources, PSBA give consideration to-

- relocating operational research and evaluation section (ORAS) functions to the QPS; and
- ORAS developing an overarching governance process to deal with Coroners recommendations, issues arising from critical debriefings, issues identified from workplace incidents, injuries both physical & psychological as well as issues from the current SERP process to inform curriculum development processes.

Active armed offenders

<u>Recommendation 26:</u> That the Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command and the Assistant Commissioner Intelligence Counter Terrorism and Major Events in conjunction with the Executive Officer Education and Training, PSBA ensure-

- that policy is developed, including a definition of AAO to underpin the curriculum, training and responses to AAO incidents; and
- the current body of work is underpinned by an evidence-base of national and international best practice and includes the appropriate components ICENRIRE, the integrated response model in Appendix B of this report and the learnings from Exercise Duplo.

Performance framework

<u>Recommendation 27:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command collaborate with the Assistant Commissioner Ethical Standards Command to consider-

- including the identification, measurement and exploration of use of force trends in the QPS Performance Framework (including current SERP functions); and *in the interim*
- expanding the role of the SERP QCC Secretariat to include the performance monitoring of the resolution of all violent confrontations; and
- the integration of an intelligence and research capacity into the SERP Secretariat function.

<u>Recommendation 28:</u> That the Deputy Commissioner Strategy, Policy and Performance consider which QPS area will own the responsibility for UOF monitoring at a strategic level.

OSTT Expert advice and evidence

<u>Recommendation 29:</u> The Executive Officer Education and Training, PSBA in conjunction with the Assistant Commissioner Ethical Standards Command establish the parameters for written and oral expert evidence to be provided by the OST unit, including-

- that the OST expert should only provide evidence on Operational Skills and Tactics Training; and
- that the QPS curriculum doctrine should be provided by a suitable Senior QPS member representing the Commissioner of Police.

Operations Support Command Initiatives

<u>Recommendation 30:</u> The Assistant Commissioner of Operations Support Command cause an evaluation of the Mobility Response Capability initiative to establish if it has a broader application for first response police across the QPS.

Ongoing monitoring of review recommendations

<u>Recommendation 31:</u> The Commissioner appoint a Senior Responsible Officer to overview an implementation team comprised of internal and external stakeholders to consult with stakeholders including relevant unions and other agencies to overview and monitor implementation of the review recommendations.

2. Background / Introduction

As a result four fatal police shootings in 2014, the Queensland Commissioner of Police stated publically:

I am saddened as I reflect on a number of recent police shootings here in Queensland.

I am sure every member of our community, including police, are concerned with the outcomes of these events because people have died as a result.

My thoughts are with all involved.

These are tragic and traumatic events for those directly impacted and the wider community in general.

As is proper, all of these incidents are currently being investigated by the State Coroner. I look forward to this independent Coronial overview and any resulting recommendations that might arise in relation to these events.

Maintaining community confidence and trust in how police go about their job, including the resolution of high-risk incidents, is critical to our success both as an organisation and as a State.

Our primary goal as sworn officers is to prevent loss of life or injury to anyone.

Let me be very clear that I have complete confidence in our/your police, their decision making and the training they receive.

These recent tragic events are relatively rare given the millions of interactions police have with the public each year including over half a million Triple Zero calls in the past 12 months. The operating environment is however often complicated by a combination of factors including mental health issues, domestic violence, and drug/alcohol abuse.

In November 2014 the Commissioner acknowledged community concern around these tragedies, announcing an immediate review of Queensland Police Service (QPS) policy, procedures and training involving violent confrontations to ensure the QPS continues to adopt international best practice. The Commissioner was clear in his expectation that the review should not interfere with or impact upon the coronial process, however was quick to identify the need for the Service to take immediate action to review processes and take action as necessary. A Steering Committee comprised of QPS Deputy Commissioner Steve Gollschewski (Chair), QPS Assistant Commissioner Bob Gee, Crime and Corruption Commission Chairman Dr Ken Levy and Acting Chief Executive Officer Dianne McFarlane, Pro Vice Chancellor (AEL) Griffith University Professor Paul Mazerolle, Deputy Chief Executive Officer (PSBA) Patrick Vidgen and Acting Deputy Chief Executive Officer (PSBA) Patrick Vidgen and Acting Deputy Chief Executive Officer (PSBA) Patrick Vidgen and overview the review process.

In developing the terms of reference it was determined that there were three overarching aims for the review:

- 1. Map QPS processes from legal principles, through policy, procedures, training to communication of expectations and standards.
- 2. Analyse whether QPS work force culture and changes to policing and community '*norms*' impact on how police resolve violent confrontations; including the propensity for violence where the police are responding to persons affected by psycho-social issues.
- 3. Examine good practice or policy that has demonstrated the potential to provide opportunities to improve outcomes.

A reference group comprised of Assistant Commissioner Bob Gee (Chair), President QLD Commissioned Officers' Union Mr Brian Wilkins, President QLD Police Union Mr Ian Leavers, Queensland Health Associate Professor John Allan, Assistant Commissioner Clem O' Regan (ESC), Assistant Commissioner Paul Taylor, Northern Region, Assistant Commissioner Paul Stewart Community Contact Command, Executive Director Kate Bradley QPS Legal Division, Inspector Roger Lowe, Coronial Support Unit provided further guidance to progress the review. The contribution of the

Mental Health Commissioner, Dr. Lesley van Schoubroeck in executive level discussions provided further insights.

3. Methodology

The review took a systematic approach, being guided by an analysis of current national and international best practice and research in police use of force (UOF), social science, criminological and psychological literature. Four broad themes emerged from the literature review. Firstly, police can be described as part of the mental health system. Police are the principle 24/7 crisis response group for the *resolution* of incidents involving people affected by a variety of psycho-social factors that escalate to violence. Secondly, *preventing* the escalation to crisis point through 'early intervention models' founded on greater integration, communication and case management across relevant government and non-government sectors is best practice. Thirdly, a major challenge in attempting to prevent the escalation of a person to crisis point is the willingness of agencies to work together to case manage people by sharing timely and relevant information. Fourthly, it is widely acknowledged that once a person has reached a crisis point the response options to assist them de-escalate become limited. It must also be noted that if a situation escalates to a point of engagement where there is a valid threat to the life of a bystanders or police officer, the motivation of the offender at that point becomes irrelevant; safety is the overriding concern at that stage.

These themes were further clarified during consultation, where feedback from an external member of the Review Steering Committee indicated that to focus attention only at the point of crisis (and the accompanying response) overlooks the underlying social issues, and the broader role of police, government and non-government agencies in prevention and early intervention. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of this broader view, which has led to the development of two key review questions:

- 1. What is the role of the QPS in the prevention of violent confrontations? And
- 2. Can the QPS response to violent confrontations once they occur be improved?





3.1 Data sources

Data collection strategies were primarily qualitative. In addition to a thorough review of academic literature, analysis of relevant policing and government documents, reviews, coronial findings and recommendations from national and international policing jurisdictions was conducted. A comprehensive bibliography of informing documents and literature can be found in Appendix A.

QPS corporate documents, policy, procedure and training material relating to police UOF, powers and responsibilities were evaluated in terms of currency, clarity of purpose and consistency.

The review team consulted with relevant stakeholders and conducted interviews with a variety of internal and external subject matter experts, including the Crime and Corruption Commission, Queensland Health and the relevant Queensland Police Unions to ensure a broad range of knowledge, skills and perspectives were incorporated into the findings, thereby increasing validity.

Observations of relevant elements of the QPS Operational Skills and Tactics Training (OSTT), First Response Officer mental health training and Police Negotiator Training were undertaken by the review team, as well as operations at the Brisbane Police Communications Centre (BPCC).

Quantitative data was extracted from multiple QPS information systems, including the Use of Force Reporting System; Ethical Standards Command (ESC) complaints system (Client Service System); Significant Event Messaging System; Queensland Police Records and Information Management Exchange (QPRIME); and Queensland Communication Assisted Dispatch (QCAD).

In addition, a survey of State District Duty Officers (DDOs), one of the groups tasked with supervising first response officers, was undertaken to gain a richer understanding of the perceptions of frontline officers, the issues faced by supervisors responding to critical incidents and the approaches they take to address such calls for service. In total 58 DDOs (44 Substantive, 13 acting and 1 Former) agreed to participate, providing representation from 10 of the 15 current Queensland police districts. Over half of respondents (56%, n=32) identified as being from Brisbane Region, with the majority of respondents at the rank of Senior Sergeant (81%, n=47). Given this was a purposive sample and DDOs are not allocated to all Queensland police districts the group surveyed does not represent first response supervisors across the State however their responses still provide valuable information to the findings of the review. Further, given the geographic locations of respondents the group is representative of the South East corner of Queensland, where the five recent shootings have occurred.

3.2 Limitations

It must be noted that there are a number of limitations with the QPS quantitative data sources used in this review. Firstly, the current QPS UOF reporting threshold does not capture the full range of options available to QPS members in the situational use of force model to resolve violent confrontations. Specifically, officers are only required to report when accoutrements are used or when a subject person is injured (including OC Spray after care and injuries attributed to handcuffing). Within these parameters the UOF data identifies the type of force used by police, the subject persons level of resistance and the reporting officer's perception of the subject person's behaviour. The UOF reporting system commenced in 2012, limiting data analysis to a two year period (2012 - 2014). This makes longitudinal comparisons impossible.

In comparison data collected by ESC related to police shootings (fatal and non-fatal) has been made available over a much longer period (2000 - 2014), however this data is limited to the collation of complaint data; if no complaint is made to police, ESC will not record data on their computer system. This data set is further limited as UOF reporting and ESC reporting are on disparate systems making the correlation and analysis of UOF and complaint data difficult.

Incidents involving UOF that do not meet the formal reporting requirements may be recorded in a variety of other ways. For example officers record their interactions with people through paperwork associated with arrests or through specific domestic violence or mental health related paperwork. Officer injuries are recorded via the QPS Incident/Injury Notification and Reporting System (IINRS). Not all officers report their injuries on this system, so injury data referred to in this report is a representation of recorded data only and cannot be said to be reflective of injuries sustained across the entire QPS workforce.

3.3 Exclusions

There are five fatal police shooting incidents which are currently the subject of an investigation by the State Coroner, one shooting is from 2013 and four shootings are from 2014. This review is not intended to presume the outcome of, or influence in any way, that ongoing investigation. The investigation of the shooting incidents is being conducted by the QPS ESC on behalf of the State Coroner, with oversight from the Crime and Corruption Commission.

In addition, the following police incidents are excluded from this review:

- Incidents that do not involve serious injury or a risk of serious injury;
- Incidents involving arrest/charging by appointment; and
- Police pursuits that do not involve any element of a violent confrontation with police.

3.4 Definitions

Much of the literature examined as part of this review relating to 'best practice' focuses on how to prevent and resolve situations where a person affected by a range of psycho-social issues experiences a crisis. However, definitions of what is meant by psycho-social, crisis and other terms varies. For the purposes of this review, the following definitions apply:

<u>Violent confrontation</u>: A hostile situation involving police where there is an immediate risk that any person is threatened with or likely to suffer injury or loss of life.

<u>Threat to harm</u>: Includes threats to kill, suicide and threats to cause serious injury.

Psycho-social issues: Includes domestic violence, drug usage, alcohol and mental health issues.

<u>Use of Lethal Force</u>: Includes the discharge of a police firearm by a police officer involved in a violent confrontation.

Person in crisis: a person acutely affected by at least one of the defined psycho-social issues - domestic violence, drug usage, alcohol and/or mental health issues.

4. Contextual Use of Force Data Analysis

To further explore the context of UOF in Queensland, a brief statistical overview of past and present QPS incidences has been provided. The data contained within this section has been sourced from multiple QPS information systems, including: UOF reporting; ESC complaint and police shootings data; Significant Event Messaging System; QPRIME and QCAD. The Violent Confrontation Review Team would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Public Safety Business Agency (PSBA) in contributing data for this review.

4.1 Policing in Queensland: 2014 in Review

The QPS provides services on a continuum of crime prevention to the investigation and prosecution of offenders. The current QPS vision is 'Members of the community work with Queensland police to stop crime and make Queensland safer'. Below is a 'snap shot' of QPS community engagement in 2014 -



Annual police engagement with the community and attendance at disturbances

- Approx. 6 million community interactions annually
- 2.4 million calls received
- 500,000, 000 calls
- 3 million RBT's performed
- 500,000 infringement notices issued
- 437,196 total number of offences reported (2013-2014)
- 69,213 Domestic & Family Violence occurrences reported to police (2014)
- 15815 drug arrests (2014)
- 5408 alcohol related assaults (2014)
- 8272 offences detected in Safe Night Precincts (2014)
- Negotiators attend 200-250 high risk jobs annually with a 99% resolution rate without loss of life
- 8153 Mental Health Emergency Examination Orders (2014)



engagement for the QPS. From January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014 the QPS' Facebook engagement was 24,762,183, Twitter engagement was 423,045 and myPolice views were 14,107,886.

Policing Services



Rapid Action Patrols (RAP) from our Police Hubs at the Gold Coast and Townsville focus on problem places, cases and crime types, delivering services appropriate to the needs of the community Improved productivity through new technology, including delivering more than 2850 QLITE mobile service devices, allowing

operational police to conduct checks during shift. Result = 30 minutes saved per officer, per shift



1st law enforcement agency in Australia to use **drone technology** in high risk situations, improving safety for officers and the community Broad bodies of research consistently show the links between the psycho-social issues defined in this report and violence. For example, excessive alcohol consumption is an important risk factor for child and spousal abuse and neglect. Research also supports a causal link between domestic homicides and the involvement of alcohol. Mental health disorders and domestic violence are also strongly correlated with research finding that perpetrators have a distinguishing set of behaviours and diagnosis related to anxiety, depression, intermittent explosive disorder and borderline personality disorder. When compounded with illicit drug use (comorbidity, or dual diagnosis) research reveals higher rates of homelessness, social isolation, suicidal behaviour, violence and anti-social behaviour.

Taking this into account the review team have reviewed QPS data holdings for 2014 calendar year and have identified the following points of significance:

- 69,213 Domestic and Family Violence occurrences were reported to the QPS; and
- QPS members made 8153 Mental Health Act Emergency Examination Orders (EEO), an increase of 50% over 5 years. Of interest, in 2014 UOF data indicates police employed a near full range of reportable UOF options on 180 persons perceived by police to have an apparent mental disorder; and
- In 2014 QPS was responsible for 15,815 drug arrests. The UOF data for the same period indicates that police used reportable UOF options on 390 persons perceived by police to be drug affected; and
- Further, in 2014 QPS responded to 5408 alcohol related assaults and that in 898 instances reportable UOF options were recorded.

4.2 Analysis of QPS shootings 2000-2014

The QPS ESC has collected and collated information relating to policing shootings from 2000-14. Prior to 2000, collection on police UOF was not channelled through a centralised unit and consequently there is limited data detailing police involvement in fatal and non-fatal shootings. As seen in Figure 2, the QPS has experienced cycles of high fatal and non-fatal police shootings in the past. Based on data sourced through ESC and coronial matters, there have been 74 recorded fatal and non-fatal police shooting incidents since 2000. Of those incidents presented, 18 resulted in a fatality of a civilian and a further four refer to the fatal shootings of police officers.




Figure 2: Record of QPS shootings 2000-14


Please note, there are currently five fatal shootings from 2013-14 which are being investigated by ESC on behalf of the Queensland Coroner. As such, these cases will not be analysed further within

this statistical overview. The following observations therefore refer to the 13 fatal police shooting incidents recorded between 2000 -2012.

The VCR team have reviewed the characteristics of the 13 fatal shootings recorded between 2000 - 2012. Results indicate that 77% (n= 10) of persons shot were recorded by the QPS as having a previous history of mental health related illness. The remaining 23% (n=3) were listed on QPS information systems as known illicit drug users, however further analysis of these cases revealed they may also have had a mental health related illness (co-morbidity).

In addition to recording police fatal and non-fatal shooting incidents, the team also analysed the volume of incidents where police have shot at vehicles (as seen in Figure 3). Similar to the results contained in the overall police shootings graph, there appear to be periods of higher and lower incidents of police shooting at a vehicle. ESC data records indicate 45% (n= 3) of total police shooting incidents involved QPS officers shooting at persons within a vehicle.

Figure 3: Records of QPS officers shooting at vehicles 2000-14



4.3 Snapshot of QPS UOF reporting 2012-14

In 2012, the QPS commenced UOF reporting which aimed to identify the type of force used by police, the subject person's level of resistance and the reporting officer's perception of the subject person's behaviour. This data is required for entry in instances where accoutrements are used (excepting restraining accoutrements), including OC Spray, or in all instances when the subject person receives an injury.

Since 2012, there have been 17,984 UOF reports submitted within the QPS. Over that time UOF reports have been steadily increasing from 4077 in 2012, 6792 in 2013 and 7115 recorded for the 2014 calendar year. The rise in UOF reporting from 2012-14 is likely reflective of reporting thresholds awareness and overall compliance and is not necessarily indicative of QPS officers using more force.

Table 1 provides a breakdown the highest reported non-lethal UOF options employed during 2012-14 to respond to persons defined in this review. The reported data indicates that OC Spray and Taser are the most frequently reported UOF options by police when responding to persons exhibiting violent behaviour. Overall, results indicate that Taser and firearm presentation has increased slightly over the calendar years. However, at this time any increases must be interpreted with caution given that QPS compliance to the UOF reporting is still developing.

In addition the review team have broken down the reported UOF incidences where OC spray, Taser presentation/use and firearm presentation/use were utilised for 2012-14. Considering the number of interactions police had with various population groups, results indicate that police employed less reportable use of force options against persons with apparent mental disorders than they did against persons who were in possession of a weapon or who were affected by drugs. Please note that persons may be represented multiple times within the below dataset (i.e. have an apparent mental disorder and be in possession of a weapon).

UOF option	Possession of a weapon	Self- harming	Abusive/ violent language	Alcohol affected	Apparent mental disorder	Drug affected	Exhibiting violent behaviour
			2012				
OC Spray	-	-	201	188	-	48	255
Taser presentation / use	107	45	196	158	48	67	195
Firearm presentation /use	133	25	-	-	19	-	64
			2013				
OC Spray	-	-	402	335	-	54	469
Taser presentation / use	213	62	394	278	62	113	431
Firearm presentation /use	193	37	-	-	39	64	97
			2014				
OC Spray	-	-	355	290	-	79	405
Taser presentation / use	239	87	483	370	93	164	493
Firearm presentation /use	231	29	-	-	38	73	105

Table 1: Highest non-lethal reported UOF options employed on people defined in this review (2012-14)

Also evident in the data is the UOF options used against people reported as self-harming. This data lacks sufficient context to identify if the presentation of a firearm under those circumstances was the only option chosen by the officer to diffuse the situation. It must be noted that were a situation was resolved without a reportable UOF option being used it will not be recorded. The literature supports that attempts at non-aggressive forms of de-escalation and where applicable allowing the individual to self-de-escalate when attempting/threatening self-harm are appropriate. UOF on individuals who are self-harming could be a standing item to be examined by the SERP Committee on a regular basis.

4.4 Injuries and assaults on police 2012-14

To provide additional context to QPS UOF interactions data from three disparate QPS computer systems has been obtained. Total relevant UOF reports and total UOF reports where an officer recorded an injury utilising the UOF system for 2012-14 is included. Police are not obligated to record an injury to themselves utilising the UOF reporting system. Injuries reported by police on the QPS Incident/Injury Notification and Reporting System (IINRS) where the mechanism of injury was categorised as either Struggling with Offender or Assaulted by Offender (or both) has been incorporated in table 2. The total number of reported assaults against police (on-duty) has obtained from the QPRIME data base and is included to provide additional perspective. The three QPS

computer systems do not interface so the data cannot be accurately compared to provide definitive analysis.

Year	Total UOF Reports- 3 categories identified in (Table 1)	Total UOF Reports Officer Injuries	Recorded Injuries (IINRS)	Total Reported Assaults on Police (on-duty)
2012	1749	127	1279	2528
2013	3243	189	1183	2361
2014	3534	145	1280	2144

Table 2: Injuries and assaults on police 2012-14

The number of UOF reports increased between 2012 and 2014 as use of the new system across the Service increased. The reported injuries to police officers attributable to struggling with an offender or assaulted by offender (or both) appears to have remained almost static. There has been a reduction in the reported assaults against on-duty police. A comparison of the data in tables 1 and 2 shows a tentative relationship between the increased use of accoutrements (O/C Spray, Taser and firearms) which are traditionally deployed from a greater distance between the subject and police officer and a reduction in reported assaults against police.

4.5 **Operational Equipment**

Police officers are mandated to use force against people under prescribed circumstances and in order to fulfil this function they are equipped with a number of pieces of operational equipment which are commonly referred to as 'accoutrements'. Police officers must qualify through annual training to be deemed proficient in the use of these accoutrements. The equipment is generally allocated personally to a qualified officer or is issued to a police establishment and then made available for use by qualified officer's attached to that station. The review found that the standard type of accoutrements issued to qualified non-specialised police officers is in keeping with other national and international jurisdictions.

Police who are not performing a specialised operational function are personally issued with the following accoutrements-

- a Glock Model 22 .40 calibre semi-automatic pistol to be carried in a Safariland holster with a spare magazine pouch to be worn on a QPS Utility Belt; and
- plain clothes officers can be issued with the Model 23 Glock pistol ("Compact") or Model 27 Glock pistol ("Sub-compact"). These can be carried in a personal issue hip, shoulder or ankle holsters.
- an ASP extendable baton, in a pouch to be worn on a QPS issued Utility Belt; and
- a pair of Saf-Lok Mark V hinged handcuffs, in a pouch to be worn on QPS Utility Belt; and
- officers can elect to wear their accoutrements on their belt, or in a QPS Load Bearing Vest; and

The following accoutrements are issued to a station for use by qualified police at that station-

 a container of First Defence Oleoresin Capsicum, in a pouch to be worn on a utility belt; and

- a Taser X-26E Conducted Energy Weapon, in a BladeTech holster to be worn on a utility belt; and
- and Protective Body Armour; and
- for qualified QPS qualified rifle users only a Remington R-4 .223 calibre semiautomatic rifle fitted with Aimpoint holographic sight system.

5. Findings

Findings from this review have been extensive, identifying a broad range of issues relating to policy, procedures, training and resourcing. Taking into account the overarching questions posed as a result of the literature review, findings will be reported thematically as identified in the QPS Violent Confrontation Review Prevention and Resolution Model (Figure 1).

5.1 **Prevention (proactive)**

The prevention of violent confrontations involving police is a complex, multi-faceted issue, given the catalyst for police engagement may not, in fact, be a criminal act. There is also an argument often made by police that they have no role in the prevention of psycho-social issues that may lead a person to crisis. However as the primary agency responsible for community safety, police are often the 24/7 first responders called to intervene in a crisis situation. As such, it is ultimately in our best interest to participate in any way possible in crisis prevention and early intervention strategies.

5.1.1 Information sharing:

In the crime prevention literature, prevention is usually categorised in three ways - primary (stop the problem before it occurs), secondary (seeks to change those at high risk) and tertiary (intervening to prevent re-offending). In the context of policing, given our mandate of preventing crime and disorder and keeping our community members safe, it is essential we adopt a proactive approach to address the complex issues facing at-risk individuals with the aim of preventing crises that may lead to a violent confrontation with police.

The principle means of prevention in this context as identified in the literature, is that of inter-agency collaboration, partnerships and information-sharing. A person may come into contact with a variety of services that aim to prevent them from reaching a crisis point, but a lack of connectivity between government agencies and service providers often results in a siloed approach; a lack of visibility over the extent of care and assistance actually required by an individual.

The key element identified in the literature review was that to prevent a person reaching crisis point the sharing of relevant information in a timely manner between government agencies and service providers is crucial. This has also been articulated in the findings of numerous coronial inquests into police shootings. However, a review of relevant state, national and international inter-agency agreements has revealed most have a narrow scope, generally focussing on an individual or specific social issue or even one component of an issue. For example the existing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between QPS and Queensland Health supports information sharing 'when a person is having a mental health crises'. This does not apply more broadly to regular and ongoing information sharing or collaboration for early intervention or prevention strategies.

Information provided by Queensland Health Stakeholders to the review team was that information critical to their examination of a patient the subject of an Emergency Examination Order is often not conveyed to them by the party transporting that person to hospital for examination. Such as the behaviour of the subject person at the time of intervention and the level and type of force required to

overcome their resistance. The ability of examining medical staff to access any notes or visual footage of the person's behaviour should also be set out in a protocol between agencies.

Likewise during court proceedings, the level of information provided to QPS Police Prosecutors is often minimal, with assessments carried out by mental health workers under provision of Chapter 7 Part 2 of the *Mental Health Act 2000* providing only brief information of little assistance in identifying potential diversion strategies such as referral to support agencies that may have an impact on future offending patterns (preventing repeat calls for service).

5.1.2 Police Intervention Initiative

In recognition of this, the QPS has implemented the Police Intervention initiative (PI), a program involving early intervention, enhanced enforcement and prosecution practices in a number of locations across the State that integrate the health, social and criminal justice responses. Under the PI the QPS has partnered with government and non-government agencies to collaboratively deliver new integrated responses as a way of deterring future offending. For example, police referral of certain violent offenders to relevant treatment and enhanced prosecution submissions has positively impacted on defendant engagement with treatment and penalties. Preliminary evaluation findings indicate a positive change in participants' cognitive, physiological and behavioural issues, as well as improved sentencing outcomes.

Technology enhancements are supporting the initiative; with prosecutors being afforded real time access to QPS databases and the internet through the installation of wireless connections at courts. In addition changes to QPRIME now provides automatic notification to prosecution personnel when an individual who had previously been subject to an Involuntary Treatment Order and dealt with under Chapter 7 Part 2 of the *Mental Health Act 2000* is charged. From this, prosecutors can liaise with Queensland Health to facilitate prompt actions and advice for consideration at initial court appearance proceedings. As a result, delays in the criminal justice system are reduced, bail and sentencing processes have been enhanced and the individual is afforded early engagement opportunities with health care providers.

Focusing attention on recidivist offenders in specific locations has enabled the PI to map service providers to individual offenders. Early engagement with recognised service providers before the first court appearance date has resulted in significant criminal justice, health and social benefits. For example court attendance rates in some locations have increased from a pre-intervention of approximately zero to being up to 75 per cent (as at November 2014), with many bail and sentencing outcomes supporting rehabilitation and deterrence. Feedback from service providers is positive, with increased effectiveness and changed offender behaviour being reported.

Early intervention strategies used by the PI have been equally effective in responding to youth offenders. Prior to the implementation of PI, in some locations as many as 60 - 70 per cent of parents did not attend children's court sittings, indicating a lack of parental supervision. Prosecutors also lacked detailed knowledge on issues impacting youth offending such as supervision levels, school attendance and negative peer groups. Police in these locations now routinely investigate these factors and parents are required to attend court and are engaged to identify bail conditions that support their supervision. Further engagement with service providers, including local Police Citizen Youth Centres (PCYC) has resulted in the development of specific programs to support the QPS response.

From this the importance of proactive information sharing and inter-agency collaboration in the identification of at-risk individuals can be seen, particularly as a means of de-escalating and deterring future offending behaviour that may potentially lead an individual into increased contact with police. The review team have observed that the fundamental principles of the PI program should be part of the daily functions performed by all Police Prosecution Corps across the state, as such the program could be embedded as a business as usual activity.

<u>Recommendation 1:</u> That the Executive Director QPS Legal Division, the Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command, the Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command and the

General Manager Frontline Digital Services, PSBA collaboratively explore opportunities to improve facilitation of information sharing across QPS, government agencies and service providers including-

- real-time information sharing between QPS and Queensland Health with a view to improved prevention and responses to persons reaching crisis point, including when UOF has been utilised by police for an Emergency Examination Order (EEO); and
- update the existing Mental Health Collaboration Memorandum of Understanding and QPS policy to include real-time information mechanisms

5.1.3 Case Management

There is a growing expectation, borne out by national and international literature, that police agencies know and understand current and emerging threats to community safety. This is achieved through the promotion and use of intelligence-led policing which focuses on problem places, cases and issues. The use of the gathered information may occur anywhere along the prevention continuum (primary, secondary or tertiary), but is an essential tool in the identification of at-risk individuals who may require case management to prevent an escalation of behaviour potentially resulting in a violent confrontation with police.

Examples of best practice in prevention and early intervention, particularly in the field of mental health are to be found in Crisis Intervention Models (CIM); referred to as 'Crisis Intervention Teams' (CIT). CIT's typically comprise of a multidisciplinary team, of police officers and health professionals (including doctors, mental health workers, ambulance and paramedic officers and in some instances an intelligence gathering capacity) jointly preventing and responding to calls for service involving people in crisis. Case management and Crisis Intervention Plans (CIP) are developed for persons identified as at risk, with the individual often contributing to their own CIP obviating the barrier of doctor / patient confidentiality.

In Queensland this strategy has been articulated through the creation of the Mental Health Intervention Program (MHIP) which established a network of Mental Health Liaison Officers (MHLO) in each mental health district who work with health agency officers to identify and case manage at risk people through repeat calls for service. Policy directing the functions of MHLO's, their training and responsibilities of regional officers in charge is comprehensively outlined in section 6.6 of the QPS Operational Procedures Manual (OPM). The strategy is also evident in the established network of Domestic Violence Liaison Officers (DVLO's) who's various tiers co-ordinate and respond to repeat calls for service relating to Domestic Violence. Policy directing the functions of DVLO's is systematically outlined in OPM 9.4.

Historically responsibility and governance of MHLOs was centrally coordinated by a full time QPS Mental Health State Coordinator. In 2013 funding for, and the strategic governance of, the MHIP (including a number of positions, one being the Mental health State Coordinator) transitioned to the newly established Public Safety Business Agency (PSBA), however operational responsibility at a regional and district level remained with the QPS. The result of this has been a lack of consistency and disconnect between strategy and operational response, with MHLOs operating independently across regions in a fragmented, uncoordinated manner. This has been further compounded by the lack of ongoing funding for training and resources due to the allocated operational budget transferring to the PSBA with the strategic governance capacity. For example under the previous arrangement MHLOs were provided with a vehicle to enhance mobility and responsiveness.

Whilst recognising the level of support available from health and other agencies is likely to differ depending on location, interviews with the former QPS Mental Health State Coordinator (now located within the Strategy and Policy Branch, PSBA) and a number of MHLOs across the state reinforced the need for a coordinated approach / framework to early intervention based on best practice and an evidence-base. This is of particular importance given ongoing trials of a variety of Crisis Intervention Models in different police districts, none of which have been formally evaluated to date. It should be noted that Queensland Health will conduct an evaluation of an early intervention model trial occurring in Caboolture. It is not known at this stage when results of that evaluation will be forthcoming.

The review team received feedback from external stakeholders expressing concerns that some specialist police teams have the potential to move away from their intended purpose. Claiming over time that teams become more tactical in nature and that the communication and tactical skills of first responders diminishes if training in areas such as mental health training is only provided to members performing specialist roles. This issue was explored by the review to ascertain it's relevance to CIT's. The results of an internal QPS review of the Cairns CIT (Cairns Co-Responder Model) undertaken in 2013 were examined. It was found that police were routinely deployed to matters that did not involve law and order nor any risk to community members and there was greater scope for the involvement of Health partners prior to the participation of police. This further highlights the necessity for a QPS driven evaluation of the current CIT's and the development of a universal framework by the QPS for CIT's.

<u>Recommendation 2</u>: The Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command give consideration to-

- revitalising the Mental Health Intervention Project; and
- developing and co-ordinating delivery of annual mental health training for all operational police, including collaboratively exploring with Executive Officer Education and Training PSBA opportunities to improve facilitation by integration with the OSTT Unit; and
- consider whether mental health training (including FRO training) should be embedded into annual OST Training; and
- re-establishing the QPS Mental Health State Coordinator position to monitor, support and give guidance to the regional and district network of Mental Health Liaison Officers; and
- appointing a QPS Domestic and Family Violence State Co-ordinator Liaison to monitor, support and give guidance to the regional, district and station network of Domestic Violence Liaison Officers and Co-ordinators.

<u>Recommendation 3:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command direct work be undertaken in collaboration with Queensland Health to formulate an evidence-based framework to underpin the early intervention initiatives such as the Crisis Intervention Teams currently utilised across the State. This should include-

• findings from a formal evaluation of the existing crisis intervention teams being trialled under the Mental Health Intervention Project; and

- the role of intelligence/information gathering in crisis intervention models; and
- a framework for developing crisis intervention plans (CIP)'s for relevant individuals; and
- the development of a training package for police on CIP's

5.1.4 Queensland Fixated Threat Assessment Centre

In identifying an exemplar model for case management early intervention currently being used within the QPS the review team analysed work being undertaken by the Queensland Fixated Threat Assessment Centre (QFTAC), a collaborative model derived from work carried out in the United Kingdom (UK). QFTAC is the first evidence based, integrated threat assessment unit outside Europe and assesses and case manages fixated persons who pose a risk to Public Office Holders (POHs), their workplaces and prominent organisations and events they are involved in.

Comprised of police officers from the Security Operations Unit, Security and Counter-Terrorism Group, Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Major Events Command (SOU) and forensic mental health professionals from the Queensland Forensic Mental Health Services (QFMHS)¹, matters referred to QFTAC are assessed using specially designed stalking threat assessment tools. Once a risk level is identified internal and external stakeholders are engaged to determine and implement an optimum case management strategy, in an attempt to reduce the level of risk apportioned to the fixated individual and the POH, including facilitating interventions such as mental health treatment.

¹Including a clinical nurse consultant, a forensic psychologist and a senior forensic psychiatrist

Over a 12 month period QFTAC received 145 individual referrals. Of these nearly half (49%) had a serious mental illness. When referred, levels of concern were primarily at the moderate level (50%), with 16% being assessed as high. After intervention the vast majority of cases referred had decreased to low risk (97%) with a small proportion (3%) remaining at a moderate level of concern². From this it can be seen that optimal use of case management and early intervention strategies, when combined with cross agency collaboration and information sharing is an effective way of identifying at risk individuals and preventing an escalation of behaviour that may lead them to a violent confrontation, including with police.

<u>Recommendation 4:</u> The Assistant Commissioner of Community Contact Command and the Assistant Commissioner Intelligence, Counter Terrorism and Major Events Command collaborate with Queensland Health to explore-

- extending the Queensland Fixed Threat Assessment Centre (QFTAC) principles to more than just Public Office Holders, identifying persons involved in domestic violence at risk of escalating to a crisis point, (for example rejected stalking and homicide); and
- working with QFTAC members to identify a risk matrix or base line indicators for domestic violence that predicts further victimisation for use by QPS members

5.2 Resolution (reactive)

The functions of Police are outlined in Section 2.3 of the *Police Service Administration Act 1990*. Essentially police respond to calls for service or become instantaneously engaged in an incident, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. During a critical incident or an emergency situation police are often the first service to respond. Due to the vast geography of Queensland police are the only crisis response capable of responding in some remote locations. The rationale for the police to intervene in the lives of persons during a crisis derives from two common law principles:


- the power and authority of police to protect the safety and welfare of the community; and
- the State's authority, which dictates protection for citizens with disabilities who cannot care for themselves.

Often both principles are involved when police are dealing with persons who pose a threat or danger to the community or to themselves.

To fulfil this role officers are sanctioned through a range of legislation, policy and procedures to use 'physical force or other techniques, including a weapon, instrument or implement to respond to an actual or perceived threat' (ANZPAA, 2013). The UOF philosophy underpins the relevant policy which provides the framework on which QPS curriculum, training and learning outcomes are developed. The curriculum, training and learning outcomes are the mechanisms through which Service standards and expectations relating to UOF are conveyed to police recruits and officers who receive training annually.

The following flow chart is a graphical illustration of the underpinning mandates and principles for QPS officers from legislation through to responses. It is crucial that policy is developed and then used to inform the curriculum development process and any subsequent learning outcomes. *Figure 4: Underpinning mandate for QPS responses*

² Data obtained from QFTAC Annual Report 2014



5.2.1 Legislation

Generally, under section 615(1) of the *Police Powers & Responsibilities Act 2000* (PPRA) or any other Act, police officers in Queensland can use 'reasonably necessary force' in the exercise of their duties. Under section 615(2) officers may also use reasonably necessary force (but not force likely to cause grievous bodily harm or death) against individuals to prevent them from escaping from custody. In 'critical situations', section 616 of the PPRA extends the power of police to the right to use force likely to cause grievous bodily harm or death. According to some, this power to use force up to, and including, lethal force is what defines the institution of policing.

However, this power is granted inherently by public consent. For police to maintain this power the public must view them as being a legitimate organisation, must respect them and approve of their actions and behaviour. Research shows that large proportions of the public have not had personal interactions with the police, instead they obtain their understanding of police and policing vicariously, primarily through the media. The rapid expansion of internet usage, social media and the 24-hour news cycle has seen an exponential increase in media and public reporting of police UOF incidents. This reporting is often inflammatory and dramatized, with the 'boundary between crime information and crime entertainment being increasingly blurred in recent years' (Dowler, Fleming & Muzatti, 2006). This, combined with the increase in 'citizen journalism' (where members of the public use mobile recording devices or phones to film interactions with police; often editing footage before loading it to social media) may reduce public confidence and/or trust in the police.

This tension between legality and legitimacy makes it imperative that the QPS promotes a clearly articulated organisational philosophy regarding officer UOF both internally and externally.

5.2.2 Philosophy

In organisational theory the term 'philosophy' defines how a work unit operates. If the purpose of an organisation defines why it exists, the organisational philosophy should explain to staff how to do their work: it should direct behaviour and guide decisions and actions, and is strongly linked to its values and culture (Margolis, 2015).

Findings from national and international UOF reviews have stated the importance of law enforcement agencies clearly articulating a philosophy which underpins policy, training and the application of the UOF. Victoria Police has adopted the philosophy that underpins their planning, implementation and evaluation of all police operations-

'The success of an operation will be primarily judged on the extent to which the use of force is avoided or minimised'

This philosophy is published in the policy rules of the agency operational manual, which further makes a clear statement of the mandatory nature of the rules, claiming them to be 'the minimum standards that employees must apply'.

A recent Canadian police review advocated the underpinning philosophy of any interaction should be

'zero deaths when police interact with a member of the public-no death of the subject, the police officer involved, or any member of the public'.

Neither of these philosophies ignore the context and complexities of police interactions with people involved in violent confrontations. The philosophical statements each acknowledge that public and police safety is of paramount importance.

Further, the philosophies more broadly articulate the Peelian Principles of Law Enforcement which hold that the ability of police to do their job is dependent in public approval, and that that to secure the willing cooperation of the public in observance of the law and maintain public respect police 'must use

only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion to achieve a police objective' (UK Government, 2012).

In determining the comparable QPS UOF philosophy, the review found there is currently no single 'point of truth', no clear, unequivocal statement prominently featured across all relevant policy, procedures, guide lines and training packages. The clarity of the QPS philosophy on UOF has been lost in the increasing complexity of policy and procedures.

For example section 14.3.1 of the QPS Operational Procedures Manual (Operational Skills and Tactics Training) indicates that

police officers should only use the 'minimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident'.

However the next section (14.3.2) of the Manual (Situational Use of Force Model 2009) advises that

'The Service has adopted the philosophy of 'Consider all Options and Practice Safety' (COPS). Police officers and watch house officers should embrace this philosophy when dealing with incidents which may require the use of force'.

The COPS philosophy is also mentioned on the QPS Good Practice Guides web page as being 'the QPS **<u>safety</u>** philosophy', not the QPS UOF philosophy.

COPS is taught and used as part of the police officer threat assessment process, where officers are instructed it is good policing practice to perform a continual threat assessment as to the level of real and potential risk to officers or others. It is used in conjunction with Person Object Place (POP) and What's Important Now? (WIN), which are also situated on the Good Practice Guides web page - not in the OPM.

The acronyms COPS, POP and WIN focus are tactical, situational / threat assessment tools. Police officers should only use the '*minimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident*' is the philosophy that should underpin all police responses. This philosophy is more reflective of the examples provided by other policing jurisdictions and promotes non-physical resolution in the form of effective communication and conflict resolution tactics where possible.

It is suggested that the statement *minimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident* should feature more prominently within the QPS UOF policy and be identified as the philosophy which underpins policy, curriculum development, training and the application of the UOF. Principally, this could occur through:

- inserting the statement emphasising 'minimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident' in a more prominent and recurring positions within Chapter 14 of the OPM;
- identifying the statement as the underpinning philosophy concerning UOF;
- embedding the statement 'minimum amount of force necessary' within curriculum development, learning outcomes and all training scenarios; and
- migration of all information relating to OSTT, policy, procedures and threat assessment tools to one site on the QPS intranet so there is one point of truth.

However, whilst being cognisant of community expectations and legal obligations that police should use only the minimum amount of force necessary to effectively resolve a situation. As an employer the QPS recognises the imperative that appropriate and sufficient UOF options be made available to operational police to enable them to effectively deal with a range of violent confrontations. Failure to do so would not only risk unnecessary injury or death to officers but to all other parties involved.

The review team sought clarification from the OSTT Unit for the use of the following terms in OST training-

- Category 1 HIGH RISK. High risk refers to an obvious risk
- Category 2 UNKNOWN RISK. Unknown risk refers to an undisclosed risk.

Police Officers are instructed that they should never use the term 'low risk', as this may create a complacent attitude. These categories are not in policy or legislation and the origin of the terminology is unclear. Inquiries with senior OST staff revealed the need for the 'high', 'unknown' distinction is perhaps not as relevant now given the emphasis on continual threat assessment.

There is also potential for confusion as the term 'high risk' is defined in the ANZPAA document, 'Australia New Zealand Guidelines for the Deployment of Police to High Risk Situations'. This definition determines the threshold for the deployment of negotiators and Police Tactical Groups.

<u>Recommendation 5:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command in conjunction with Executive Officer Education and Training PSBA direct work to ensure-

- the QPS statement "minimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident" is clearly identified as being the QPS use of force philosophical statement underpinning all policy, procedure, Operational Skills and Tactics Training curriculum development and training; and
- clarification is sought as to the current requirement for use of the terms 'high risk' and 'unknown risk' in training having regard the current threat assessment tools, POP, COPS and WIN also currently outlined in QPS policy.

5.2.3 Policy & Procedure

QPS UOF Policy

In addition to legislation and organisational philosophy, the UOF by members of the QPS is heavily governed by policy. Section 14.3 of the Operational Procedures Manual (OPM) is the principal source of police policies and procedures on the UOF. The 'Situational Use of Force Model' contained within the OPM is used to guide police in their UOF options. The model (shown in Figure 5, below) allows officers to select justified UOF options (e.g. presence, open hand tactics, tactical withdrawal, baton, situational containment, firearm) to escalate and de-escalate force to resolve an incident safely, most effectively and with minimum UOF.




Figure 5: QPS Situational Use of Force model 2009

The policy provides that any UOF application must be:

(i) authorized;

- (ii) justified;
- (iii) reasonable / proportionate / appropriate;
- (iv) legally defensible; and
- (v) tactically sound and effective

In promoting a situational UOF model, as opposed to a linear model the current QPS UOF framework aligns with the Australia New Zealand Police Use of Force Principles which state that 'police organisations should use a situational model to guide police in operational decision making' (ANZPAA, 2013).

Whilst acknowledging the QPS UOF model reflects current national best practice standards the review team identified some sections of the governing policy lack clarity and synergy with other sections of the OPM. For example a number of UOF options illustrated in the model are not clearly defined in the accompanying policy; specifically the terms tactical withdrawal, situational containment and de-escalation are not defined within the OPM. Similarly, there is limited guidance and instruction given by the OPM on how officers are to achieve these positions or states. It is also unclear where de-escalation options and planning fit into the model. The model and policy are silent on how to de-escalate a situation prior to or upon police attendance at an incident.

In addition, the QPS UOF model is focused on providing officers an operational framework for the point of engagement with a subject and how to resolve the incident upon attendance. Neither the UOF model nor relating policy (in Chapter 14 of the OPM) provide advice / guidance on the necessary planning approach which should be adopted when attending an incident. Instead the primary QPS policy provision for incident planning is situated in Chapter 1 of the OPM - Incident Command - which provides a detailed outline of the roles, duties and responsibilities of officers designated the role of command at an incident.

Section 1.12.7 of this chapter gives assistance to officers in the form of Incident Action Plans (IAPs), used to direct staff and resources to resolve an incident as efficiently and safely as possible. The IAP is intended to result in an immediate course of action to achieve one or more of the following objectives: Isolate, Contain, Evacuate, Negotiate, Resolve, Investigate, Rehabilitate, Evaluate, and are collectively known by the acronym ICENRIRE. The policy further articulates that any response / action during an incident should occur within a framework of objectives reflecting ICENRIRE.

The other relevant section of the OPM containing guidance for police response to incidents that may lead to a violent confrontation is Chapter 17 - Major Incidents, where section 17.3.7 (Tactically Dangerous Situations) advises responding officers to consider the need for specialist response resources (including police negotiators and other emergency services including any requirement for a doctor, clergy or interpreter). Policy and procedures relating to specialist support are contained within section 2.19 of the OPM.

Considering the necessity wherever possible for officers to have a detailed, accurate understanding of the contextual elements feeding an incident they are tasked with responding to, it is imperative that the elements of planning and response are better integrated within the QPS situational UOF framework. The fact that current QPS policy and direction relating to UOF, planning and incident management is fragmented and not centrally located is inconsistent with best practice which promotes a planned response to protect the safety of all concerned. To illustrate how this could be achieved, the review team have developed an integrated response model that better encapsulates best practice through the amalgamation of both the QPS situational UOF model and the ICENRIRE principles (Appendix B).

The propensity for violence confrontations with police during the G20 summit was high as evidenced by previous summits were large scale civil unrest and violence occurred, however the successful hosting of the G20 summit by Queensland in 2014 highlighted the crucial role police planning, use of intelligence data and presence plays in ensuring community safety is maintained.

<u>Recommendation 6:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command continue directing work to progress the QPS Operational Procedure Manual to integrate all relevant use of force and incident management policy and procedures into a single, cohesive section or chapter to better reflect the necessary synergy between planning and responses to an incident. Including placing the UOF philosophical statement in a more prominent position in Chapter 14 of the OPM.

<u>Recommendation 7:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command in conjunction with the Executive Officer Education and Training PSBA collaborate to ensure-

- the current QPS situational use of force model in policy is enhanced to illustrate the need for an integrated response incorporating planning and the elements of Isolate, Contain, Evacuate, Negotiate, Resolve, Investigate, Rehabilitate, and Evaluate (ICENRIRE) to all police incidents (Appendix B); and
- best practice definitions of tactical withdrawal, situational containment, de-escalation and 'planning the approach' are identified and that chapter 14.3 OPM is amended with their inclusion.

5.2.4 Police shooting at vehicles

As expressed earlier, 45% of all police shootings between 2000 and 2014 involved QPS members shooting at moving vehicles. Given this, it is important that clear, consistent policy is elucidated to all members.

Current QPS policy and instructions to officers regarding the use of firearms in violent confrontations involving moving vehicles is contained in section 14.7 of the OPM and advises that-

'Officers should not use a firearm to fire at moving vehicles. Where possible, an officer threatened by an oncoming vehicle should move from its path instead of discharging a firearm at the vehicle or at its occupant/s'.

Section 10.7.2 of the QPS Traffic Manual specifically references the above in relation to police pursuits, advising that 'officers are to comply with the provisions of s.14.7 'Use of Firearms' of the OPM in regard to the use of firearms'. OPM 14.7 and the Manual state-

'this policy must be complied with under ordinary circumstances and <u>may only be departed from if</u> there is good and sufficient reason(s) for doing so'.

The policies attempt to dissuade the use of firearms against moving vehicles but provides opportunity for an officer to still discharge their firearm if they have 'good and sufficient reason'. Section 616 of the PPRA provides the statutory authority for police in critical situations to use force likely to cause grievous bodily harm or death. The legislation is quite specific in its provisions and does not use the language 'good and sufficient reason(s)'.

An examination of this issue in national and international policing jurisdictions found that many, particularly in the United States of America (USA) specifically direct officers not to shoot at vehicles, and move out of the way instead (as indicated in the OPM). For example 'four decades ago The New York City Police Department instituted a policy that officers not fire at a moving vehicle unless their life was in danger from something other than the vehicle. Since then, not a single officer has been killed by a driver trying to run over an officer or otherwise attempting to avoid arrest. Additionally, research in the area highlights the necessity for officers to have a minimal number of exceptions or special circumstances to consider when a split second decision is needed (PERF, 2005).

The review team maintains QPS policy prescription should accurately reflect legislation and best practice. It is therefore suggested that there is scope within current QPS policy to amend equivocal phrases such as 'good and sufficient reasons' to more accurately reflect the circumstances in law in which a police officer may be justified in using lethal force by shooting at a moving vehicle i.e. *"when an officer reasonably apprehends death or grievous bodily harm to themselves or another person and the officer's actions do not pose a foreseeable risk to other persons in the immediate vicinity and the officer reasonably believes they cannot otherwise defend themselves or the other person."*

As a result of the analysis of relevant QPS data holdings, training curriculum and coronial recommendations, further salient points are identified:

- The QPS does not consistently train police how to respond when they are threatened by an oncoming moving vehicle;
- The human response is slower than the speed of the vehicle, therefore potential exists for the police officer to commence shooting at an oncoming vehicle and be unable to cease firing upon the vehicle when it is no longer a threat (autonomous response); and
- The duty of care police have to the broader community if the vehicle loses control as a result of the shooting (as evidenced in the 2007 police shooting of Brett Johnston, where police fatally shot Mr Johnston and the vehicle he was driving subsequently careened into a house).

The review received feedback that after four incidences of police shooting at vehicles in 2011 and 2012 (indicated in figure 3) ESC made a request that training on 'not shooting at vehicles' be delivered by OSTT. Subsequently in 2012 a power point presentation titled 'Use of Firearms and Moving Vehicles' was incorporated into OST training. In 2013 there was one incident of a police officer shooting at a vehicle. In 2014 there were five incidences of police officers shooting at vehicles and in mid-2015 ESC requested that training on 'not shooting at vehicles' is included in the 2016 OST curriculum. The training will be incorporated into the 2016 OST curriculum as a computer based training package.

Further stakeholder feedback raised concerns regarding the positioning of police vehicles in these situations, with police placing themselves in tactically unsound situations thereby reducing the number of options to resolve the incident without the use of firearms. Consequently the review has identified that best practice is a combination of enhanced training permanently embedded in OSTT, restrictive policy and consistent senior management messaging.

<u>Recommendation 8:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command direct a review of section 14.7 of the Operational Procedure Manual and section10.7.2 of the QPS Traffic Manual to -

- remove ambiguity and clearly articulate the circumstances in law when an officer would be justified in shooting at a moving vehicle; and
- ensure that the policy is restrictive in nature and reflective of the legislation; and
- include reference to a duty of care regarding the foreseeable risk associated with any loss of control of the vehicle subsequent to police shooting at it.

<u>Recommendation 9:</u> The Deputy Commissioner Strategy, Policy and Performance, in conjunction with the Deputy Chief Executive Officer PSBA direct work be undertaken to-

- permanently embed training on 'not shooting' at vehicles as a fundamental element of the OSTT curriculum annually; and
- ensure the training adequately addresses the appropriate positioning of vehicles; and
- assess whether a computer based training product to be introduced in the 2016 OSTT curriculum adequately addresses the issue of police 'not shooting' at vehicles;

<u>Recommendation 10:</u> The Commissioner of Police considers impressing upon the QPS Executive Leadership Team to consistently and actively message that the QPS policy on 'not shooting at moving vehicles' is restrictive.

5.2.5 Curriculum & Training

Police and recruit training in Queensland is currently the responsibility of the Public Safety Business Agency's Education and Training Groups. The Queensland Police Service Academy provides training predominantly through three campuses, located at Oxley, Wacol and Townsville. The mission of Education and Training is:

'To enhance the professional and operational capability of the QPS through high quality, innovative and relevant education and training'.

Findings from previous reviews of police education and training (including in Queensland) have consistently advocated strategic planning and governance of syllabus and curriculum to assist in the achievement of organisational aims and objectives. A 2010 review highlighted evidence from reviews of QPS education and training spanning a 20 year period, all of which articulated a lack of any overarching strategic vision, direction or planning process in the development of training (Towner & Jones, 2010).

A consistent approach to police education and training that aligns with national education systems is a key element of the Standing Council for Law, Crime and Community Safety's *Directions in Australia and New Zealand Policing 2012-2015*. To ensure police education and training remains fit for purpose and meets the future needs of policing and service delivery to the community the Australia New Zealand Council of Police Professionalisation (ANZCOPP) has overseen the development of the Police Practice Standards Model (PPSM) which when fully implemented will provide foundations for consistent education and training across policing jurisdictions leading to common practice standards. To date two of the four key elements of the PPSM have been implemented (the identification of policing Practice Levels, and the development of ANZPAA Education and Training Guidelines).

To determine to what extent current Queensland police UOF training is developed and delivered in accordance with an evidence based, best practice the review team undertook an examination of the current OSTT curriculum content delivered across all QPS programs. Further informed by interviews with key stakeholders from PSBA Education and Training (ET), the entire program was mapped to illustrate the relevant subject matter across various ranks and work units within the QPS. The process map is provided as (Appendix C) and should be referred to when considering the following findings.

5.2.6 Curriculum development and oversight

The Operational Skills Training Unit (OSTU), PSBA is responsible for the design and development of operational skills programs delivered to all police officers across the State, including recruit training. The aim of these programs are to

'equip officers with the necessary skills, knowledge, competence and ability to deal with policing incidents utilising all aspects of the use of force options lawfully, safely, effectively and efficiently'.

The unit is comprised of five sections: Policing Skills (recruit training), Firearms Training (recruits), Driving Skills (recruits), Operational Skills (all in-service police) and the Operational Research Advisory Section (ORAS).

Advice from ET stakeholders is that the OSTT curriculum is reviewed and revised as necessary by OSTU annually. Curriculum is influenced by current operational requirements, changes to national guidelines, QPS policy and procedure, risk management, litigation and judicial issues including findings from coronial investigations. Advice was also provided that research is regularly conducted to identify national and international best practice with a view to continuous improvement.

Between 1991 and 2012 external advice and oversight of the curriculum was provided by the Police Education Advisory Council (PEAC), however since the disestablishment of PEAC in 2012 there has

been no external advice or oversight provided. Currently the proposed curriculum is presented to key internal stakeholders for approval at the QPS executive Leadership Team Conference and the QPS Academy Curriculum Governance Committee.

A further confounding factor is that currently police training development and delivery is governed by PSBA, making the QPS a 'user' rather than a 'supplier' of UOF training to its officers. This is of concern given the Service owns the risk / liability of ensuring officer actions are lawful. The issue of curriculum 'ownership' is being considered as part of a current review being undertaken by ET and in February 2015 the QPS Renewal Program Board resolved that they will oversee the future direction of UOF policy decisions and make necessary recommendations to the QPS Board of Management.

Another finding of concern was that despite recommendations made from previous reviews of police education and training, there is still a lack of strategic oversight of curriculum development and training delivery. A siloed approach exists, evident from the process map (Appendix C), which reveals responsibility for police training relevant to UOF situations is held by at least 10 different programs across both the QPS and PSBA. Specialist Negotiator training is also delivered by Operations Support Command (OSC) through the State Negotiation Unit, thereby making overall consistency of curriculum extremely challenging and problematic. Considering this, it cannot be assumed that all elements of police curriculum are reflective of current best practice.

The lack of synergy was observed by the review team in particular at the Oxley campus with the lack of integration in curriculum and training between the OST Unit (PSBA), Incident Command Unit (PSBA) and the State Negotiation Unit (OSC). Negotiator skills in de-escalation and active listening have been identified as the exemplar set of communication skills for all QPS officers and Appendix B highlights the integration required between Incident Command Unit and the OST Unit. During the review advice was also provided by members of the OST Unit claiming they do not currently have the capacity to maintain a rigorous audit process of the quality of instructors, facilitation or training venues given curriculum delivery is provided through a dispersed network of trainers, through a variety of mediums to a varied audience in disparate training modules, lacking overall synergy.

<u>Recommendation 11:</u> The Deputy Commissioner Strategy Policy and Performance, in conjunction with the Deputy Chief Executive Officer PSBA oversee the realignment of police training to ensure-

- as the user of training the QPS is the primary decision maker regarding curriculum development; and
- the development of an on-going evidence based governance process that informs the evolution of training and methodology.

<u>Recommendation 12:</u> The Deputy Commissioner Strategy, Policy and Performance, in conjunction with the Deputy Chief Executive Officer PSBA, the Assistant Commissioner Operations Support Command and the Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command direct collaborative work be undertaken on UOF curriculum development and training delivery service-wide to-

- identify an overarching strategic framework that ensures the quality and consistency of all UOF officer training and OSTT instruction state-wide; and
- establish whether a global curricula for UOF training would ensure quality and consistency; through ongoing integration and collaboration between State Negotiator Unit (OSC), OST Unit (PSBA), Incident Command Unit (PSBA) and MHLO Co-Ordinator (CCC); and
- evaluate the current structure, sequencing and 'down time' of the existing blocks of OST training to identify efficiencies where training could be enhanced; and
- evaluate the capability of the current OST instructor cohort to establish if they have the capability to deliver the integrated training; and
- ensure further collaboration between State Negotiator Unit (OSC), OST Unit (PSBA), Incident Command Unit (PSBA) and MHLO Co-Ordinator (CCC) to develop an integrated training package to be delivered to the OST instructor cohort

<u>Recommendation 13:</u> The Deputy Commissioner Strategy, Policy and Performance, in conjunction with the Deputy Chief Executive Officer PSBA consider the establishment of a suitable body (similar to PEAC) to provide advice and external oversight of curriculum development and training delivery.

5.2.7 Training content

The literature review conducted by the review team identified that planning, communication and deescalation are critical elements to the successful resolution of violent confrontations by police with the use of minimal force. Key in the literature is the need to ensure officer UOF training includes an emphasis on what may be termed 'low end' UOF strategies; that is, an emphasis on planning the initial approach and contact (officer presence) as well as verbal and non-verbal communication skills. An action item from the recent US Presidents Taskforce on 21st Century Policing (2015) advises that all law enforcement agency policies and training relating to UOF emphasise de-escalation. Including recognition that some incidents with persons affected by social issues can be resolved with minimal or no police contact through allowing self-de-escalation or interventions by health agencies.

Traditional police training and culture mandates police never back down from a confrontation. Police typically run towards the dangerous situations which everyone else in running away from. However, contemporary thinking proposes, sometimes the best tactic for dealing with persons with social issues is to step back and consider alternatives to the traditional 'move forward' approach (Presidents Task Force, 2015).

The review explored training delivery at the Townsville campus of the Queensland Police Academy. The Townsville campus is smaller facility with fewer facilitators and recruits. In Townsville they have more of a 'cradle to grave approach' where the same facilitators contribute to many facets of their squad of recruit's pre-service training. The facilitator has a more diverse set of skills and is able to make a more holistic assessment of a recruits abilities, including their ability to communicate having personally observed them over more of their training continuum whilst at the Academy.

A universal theme that emerged during the review was that all skills are perishable if they are not practiced, this is one of the tenants on which annual OST training is premised. However the review found that the QPS does not have a particular focus on annual training relating to verbal communication, planning or incident management. It is assumed that these skills are innate or learnt vicariously through policing experience.

5.2.8 Communication

The OSTT process map clearly illustrates points in an officer's career where formal training in communication skills is provided. It can be seen that communication training is delivered across a range of modules to recruits, with effective communication being a core attribute recruits are assessed against during their training. However, this significantly diminishes throughout the in-service curricula. During interviews with the Officers in Charge of QPS Recruiting and the Recruit Training Unit it was identified that although communication skills are part of the curriculum in relation to UOF the emphasis is strongly on tactical communication involving forceful / aggressive directions at the point of crisis and typically immediately before the application of UOF, rather than more peaceable conflict resolution skills. This focus on forceful direction communication styles is maintained across all elements of OSTT and is reinforced annually to police during manual firearms training, with limited opportunities for officers to practice communication skills (including verbal and non-verbal) focusing on the initial approach to an incident, and in scenario based training involving persons displaying symptoms and behaviours of a person with a mental illness.

Further it was found that communication does not feature as a discrete meaningful assessment item at applicant level. A recent audit conducted by the Recruit Training Program PSBA found interpersonal assessments occur in one-on-one or controlled environments such as psychological interviews and panel interviews. The test of verbal communication involves the applicant running for 30 seconds and then utilising a police radio to ensure that they can be understood on the radio in those circumstances.

The lack of emphasis on communication is of concern given research acknowledging policing as an occupation requiring high levels of interpersonal communication skills. This was articulated at the 2012 Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) where concern was raised that generationally, younger officers appear more comfortable communicating via technology, using text messages, social media and emails rather than verbal or face to face interactions. This was seen as problematic as it was felt that having interpersonal communication skills may assist an officer in resolving a situation without having to resort to high levels of force.

This is further supported by literature which claims that when police officers are recruited, selected and trained little emphasis is placed on social intelligence (a person's ability to interact / connect with others). Williams (2012) advises that the increased use of technology in policing may unintentionally diminish an officer's capacity to interact personally with members of the public. Additionally, it is claimed that whilst community engagement is the foundation of the vision or mission statement of many police organisations, modern policing methods including the use of technology (including the use of on-line crime reporting) have further removed opportunities for police-public interaction on an everyday basis. Therefore the implied assumption that police officers have the necessary skills and ability to develop relationships in any situation may be false.

To further explore this issue, the review team conducted structured interviews with four police officers purposely sampled due to their experience of performing duties in remote or rural communities. The officers were asked to comment on whether they felt police in rural or remote locations have enhanced verbal communication skills, and whether knowledge of the subject person is crucial to being able to de-escalate their behaviour during a crisis.

Commonality of responses were agreement that police in rural or remote communities do have enhanced communication skills, the genesis of which is the personal rapport built between community members and police being active in their community - both professionally and socially. It was also agreed that personal knowledge / information is crucial to understanding how to calm a situation. This is also important in having an understanding of which support networks should be contacted for assistance if necessary. It was also articulated that in some remote locations there is no prospect of 'police backup', so enhanced communication and negotiation skills are essential to diffuse situations. It was felt that unlike rural and remote communities, police in larger metropolitan areas are more anonymous and their knowledge gained from computer checks, which are essentially the learnings from previous interactions with a subject person.

Whilst a proposal seeking implementation of a core communication component to critique an applicant's interpersonal and group skills and conflict resolution abilities has recently been submitted to the Executive Director, Human Resources PSBA, the review team in examining best practice literature found that a mental health first aid course should also be a mandatory pre-requisite for prospective police recruits. Best practice also emphasised increased weight should be placed on applicants who have worked in community service areas and have tertiary education. Advice from the Manager, Recruiting PSBA is that there is an internal review of recruiting practices underway which it is hoped will incorporate many of these concerns.

<u>Recommendation 14:</u> The General Manager Human Resources, PSBA include in the current recruiting review the implementation of a core communication component to specifically assess applicants' interpersonal and conflict resolution skills.

5.2.9 Negotiator and First Response Officer Training

The best practice literature examined by the review team identified enhanced negotiation skills involving careful verbal communication, de-escalation techniques and interpretation of non-verbal cues are considered effective skills to deal with most persons with psycho-social issues in crisis. Whilst important, the advice from the QPS State Negotiator Unit is that active listening is by far the

most critical communication skill a Negotiator needs to resolve an incident they are called to attend. When examining QPS training programs the First Response Officer (FRO) training program was identified as an example of internal QPS best practice in this area. The training provides for dynamic scenarios for officers to practice using communication to de-escalate confrontation with persons suffering mental illness. Presently, the training is delivered only to First Year Constables in Police Regions through a small team from Mental Health Services, QPS Mental Health Liaison Officers (MHLOs) and Police Negotiators. FRO training is delivered completely independently of OSTT.

There are currently three full time, and 114 part-time negotiators across the state with enhanced skills in verbal communication and interpretation of non-verbal cues. Information received from the QPS State Negotiator Unit was that in the last 15 years they have had a 99.3 per cent success rate of resolving matters where 'loss of life was imminent' by peaceful means. The Negotiator Co-ordinator for the QPS provided advice to the review team that existing negotiators could be utilised to provide input into de-escalation and tactical communication training during annual OSTT programs. As one option, it was discussed this training could be facilitated during 'downtime' that presently exists in the current OSTT program when officers are awaiting their turn to participate in other UOF training scenarios. Alternatively a better option could be for police negotiators to have input into enhancing curriculum development to ensure active listening and communication skills are embedded as a training outcome for OSTT.

5.2.10 De-escalation

Between 2000 and 2015 QPS officers fatally shot 18 males. All of those males had psycho-social issues as defined by this review. 77 % (n = 14) had underlying mental health concerns, 66% (n = 12) experienced co-morbidity, namely drug use and mental health issues, and 22% (n = 4) were found to have used drugs. The research of best practice literature identifies that where possible a planned approach with the utilisation of de-escalation tactics should be employed when dealing with persons affected by psycho-social issues. The contemporary best practice does not ignore, or suggest that police lives should be placed at risk when dealing with a person affected by a psycho social issue, but it does support the notion that police should where ever possible obviate the risk to themselves and the person in crisis by having enhanced situational awareness, planning their approach and de-escalating the persons behaviour.

The review team identified there is opportunity to modify OSTT to include a greater emphasis on the lower end of the UOF continuum. Current OSTT has a strong focus on particular options in the QPS UOF model, namely the use of firearms, Taser, OC spray, baton and restraining accoutrements. The training lacks a balance in utilising the components of the model that resolve violent confrontations without accoutrements; namely presence, open/closed hand tactics, communication skills, situational containment and tactical withdrawal.

Research found an example where Las Vegas Police Department (LVPD) in 2014 issued a policy directive that de-escalation training requirements were to be embedded in their training curriculum. Various instructional mediums are used so officers receive repeated instruction on how to tactically de-escalate an incident by-

- -Slowing the momentum to 'slow down the action';
- -Creating distance between the officers and the subjects and, therefore, increasing the time necessary to react to danger;
- -Assembling additional resources, including personnel and less-lethal options;
- -Proper supervisory management of multiple officer incidents.

It has been earlier established that the delivery of OSTT curriculum is impacted by time, cost, resources, location, quality of the instruction and training facilities. Interviewees identified there is a perceived lack of time to train police and priority is given to the UOF options which present higher level risks to officers. As an example, scenarios every year include high threat confrontations with edged weapons and firearms. There is very limited opportunity in current OSTT scenarios for an officer to resolve an incident through means other than through the application of physical force.

Further feedback on this was provided by members of the review Steering Committee, Reference Group and executive members of the Queensland Health Commission who observed an OSTT scenario demonstration at the Brisbane Police Academy in early 2015. It was commented that officers had not been afforded an opportunity to plan their approach or allowed to tactically withdraw or deescalate the situation. They further questioned why an officer would move towards a person who appeared to want to self-harm and had requested that police leave. In addition, it was pointed out that the training lacked context as the officer was just placed in the room with no opportunity to plan their approach and/or enhance situational awareness prior to entry. Given the data presented elsewhere in this report relating to UOF options employed on persons self-harming, and the literature which supports non aggressive methods of de-escalation or self-de-escalation in these circumstances this is an issue of concern.

There are also a number of de-escalation strategies employed by other agencies, outside of law enforcement, to respond to potential violent confrontations without employing lethal use of force. Within the field of health, general practitioners and emergency department employees regularly encounter persons displaying aggressive and at times violent behaviours. Particular reference has been made in the Queensland Mental Health Patient Transport Agreement (MHPTA) 2014 to allow agitated persons to be involved in the process to regulate or 'self de-escalate' their own behaviour.

Further research has shown that experience in simulation exercises becomes the officers' point of reference that aids in recognition primed decision making. Recognition primed decision making underpins how an officer will respond in times of stress and when dealing with a person in crisis. The review team maintains that in keeping with best practice it is therefore important that the learning outcomes of OSTT reflect the ability to use all UOF options (including self-de-escalation of the individual). The QPS recipients of the 2015 Suncorp Scholarship are currently undertaking overseas education and training that specifically examines best practice elements of de-escalation training and curriculum. The intended outcome of this work is its ultimate incorporation into QPS training curriculum.

<u>Recommendation 15:</u> The Executive Officer Education and Training PSBA direct work be undertaken to ensure that the Operational Skills and Tactics Training program learning outcomes permanently encapsulate a balance of all use of force options in learning outcomes with a greater emphasis on-

- planning the approach (including vehicle placement), communication and de-escalation; and
- that the findings from the QPS recipients of the 2015 Suncorp Scholarship (State Negotiators Unit) currently exploring de-escalation best practice are considered in the curriculum development.

5.2.11 Rendering assistance (first aid)

'The provision of services, and the rendering of help reasonably sought' are outlined in section 2.3 of the *Police Service Administration Act 1990* (PSAA) and requires police officers to 'render help that is reasonably sought' in accordance with the 'reasonable expectations of the community'. This is also reflected in national UOF guidelines which require police to

'ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or affected persons at the earliest opportunity' (ANZPAA, 2013).

Current OSTT highlights the responsibility of officers to apply first aid as soon as it is safe to do so. However whilst certification in first aid is a pre-requisite for QPS police recruits, not all officers maintain competency / currency in first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Accordingly this poses a risk to the Service from a legal and reputational perspective.

The current QPS policy in relation to first aid management is contained in Human Resource Policy 2012/19: First Aid and Infection Control in compliance with the *Work Health and Safety Act 2011* (WHSA). The policy is intended to meet the requirements for the provision of first aid in QPS

workplaces and does not reflect the intent of s 2.3 of the PSAA. Additionally 2.4 of the PSAA outlines that the functions outlined in 2.3 PSAA do not derogate from the responsibilities of the community at large to work in partnership with members of the service to preserve peace and good order. The review found numerous QPS policies which indicate when officers are to ensure first aid is rendered including but not limited to first responders at traffic accident, deaths in custody and the use of accoutrements such as Conducted Energy Weapons (Tasers) and Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Spray.

In June 2015 the findings from the Coronial Inquest into the death of Neville Reading were delivered. The Coroner indicated the merits of ensuring all serving police officers have 'up-to-date knowledge and skills of first aid and CPR' to confidently respond to requests for assistance to community members and fellow officers. Further, it was acknowledged that police are often first responders, even if a request has been made for the assistance of Queensland Ambulance Services (QAS). The coroner recommended that:

'The Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service consider incorporating relevant CPR and other first aid response training into annual Operational Skills & Tactics Training provided to police officers' (Ryan, 2015).

A recent article from Cantrick (2015) upholds this position, the article claims that police do not need generalist first aid training; instead the need for 'tactical medicine', or 'combat first aid' is articulated, focussing on providing officers medical skills to effectively manage a trauma situation whilst still maintaining situational awareness at a critical incident to ensure the safety of all concerned prior to the arrival of further medical assistance.

Work being undertaken by the QPS and Safety and Wellbeing, PSBA has identified that a number of Australian police jurisdictions require their officers to maintain first aid certification. New South Wales (NSW) appear to provide training similar to the recommendation from Reading, in that limited first aid refresher training forms part of their annual internal Operational Safety Skills Mandatory Training; with delivery alternating between theory and practice each year. The current work within QPS and PSBA regarding first aid training for in-service police officers aims to provide senior management with a comprehensive assessment and findings of relevant factors including reputational risk and training options. The findings from this body of work will inform future policy, curriculum and training development across the Service.

<u>Recommendation 16</u>: The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command and the General Manager, H.R. PSBA direct the outcomes of work currently being undertaken within QPS and PSBA in relation to first aid training for in-service police is used to inform future development of relevant policy, procedures and training by January 31, 2016.

5.3 Response

When discussing police responses to critical incidents consideration also needs to be given to contextual issues that may impact, even on a planned response. For example attempts may have already been made to de-escalate a situation by other agency practitioners (such as health workers, community safety officers etc.), many of whom will themselves use physical force to subdue / restrain a person they are unable to de-escalate, and who articulate in their policy and procedures the need to call for police assistance if a situation becomes too volatile or poses a risk to them. This is likely to limit the capacity for police responders to resolve an incident without resorting to a UOF option, even if circumstances allow for a planned approach.

It is also important to remember that police have a mandate to respond with a use force that is reasonably necessary against individuals in critical situations. On many of these occasions police may be called upon to respond to a violent confrontation under circumstances that do not allow for advanced planning; inherent in any police interaction is the underlying risk that a situation may be instantaneously volatile or rapidly escalate to a violent confrontation to which the officer must respond immediately.

5.3.3 Calls for service

The importance of accurately recorded caller information and the provision of same to first responders has been highlighted in various coronial findings (for example Byrne, 2014 and Barnes, 2008). An examination of best practice approaches in this area identified the need for the application of risk assessment matrix/indicator tools to all calls for service that include clear triggers and thresholds mandating immediate notification to operational supervisors from police communication centres (PCC) as a means of increasing situational awareness.

The review team met with PCC staff in leadership and training roles. From this it was identified that there is a lack of certainty / clarity regarding the extent to which PCC's exercise a command and control function in managing the first response to an incident that may result in a violent confrontation with police, with little governance to inform decision making applied to calls for service by either PCC staff or operational supervisors. Currently, PCC response is determined by what resource is next available, and any value-adding is essentially based on a subjective assessment made by the PCC call taker at the time. In addition, training of Communication Room Operators (CROs) lacks consistency across the state. Given the integral role of PCCs and CROs in building, maintaining and improving situational awareness for responding officers it is essential that a greater understanding and appreciation of their role in the ongoing management of critical incidents is articulated. To illustrate this, the role and function of PCCs has been included in the proposed integrated response model developed by the review team (Appendix B) and proposed changes to the current PCC Urgent Call Lifecycle flow chart have been drafted for consideration (Appendix D).

Further discussions revealed that there are two bodies of working being undertaken concurrently within the Service. First, learnings from the 2014 G20 Summit are being used to develop an improved service-wide command and control doctrine. In addition, the Superintendent, Brisbane PCC is reexamining the role of PCC in the management of significant incidents with a view to providing better support to forward commanders. Rather than have these projects continue independently of each other, it is suggested it would be beneficial to amalgamate both bodies of work to develop best practice policy and guidelines underpinned by the understanding that a considered, planned and supervised approach to incidents is essential to a positive outcome, that clearly establish the role and responsibilities of PCCs regarding the deployment of resources and the level of command and control they possess in response and continued management of incidents that may lead to a violent confrontation. In doing so, consideration should be given to the extent to which District and Regional management clearly articulate to PCCs their deployment priorities and thresholds.

<u>Recommendation 17:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command and the Assistant Commissioner of Operational Capability Command collaborate with the Executive Officer Education and Training PSBA to ensure an integrated response to the projects relating to command and control and management of significant incidents to-

- ensure outcomes achieved are cohesive and reflect current best practice; and
- identify and baseline UOF training, incident management and information sharing principles for sworn and unsworn members in keeping with their role in policing responses (highlighted in Appendix B). Including PCC staff and supervisors participating in incident command training and multijurisdictional exercises; and
- identify opportunities to improve communications room processes including risk assessment frameworks that identify critical information to disseminate to operational police, enhance the situational awareness of operational police and enhance outcomes of violent confrontations involving police, (considering the proposed changes in Appendix D); and
- ensure the command and control doctrine is integrated into OST training

5.3.2 Dissemination of Critical Information.

The timely dissemination of relevant information by PCC operators is crucial to establishing and maintaining the situational awareness of operational police officers and enhances their ability to activate specialist support such as negotiators at the earliest opportunity. Queensland Coroner's

courts have previously taken a negative view where mobile phones have been utilised to disseminate critical information due to the relative efficacy of the police radio over mobile phones as a method to disseminate critical information to all police at incidents.

The review team interviewed members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who were visiting Queensland. They expressed the importance of communications room staff being appropriately trained and that their involvement in incident command exercises was beneficial, ensuring their knowledge and skills did not perish. The FBI members also provided feedback that the use of encrypted radios was critical to their communication flows whilst they were managing and investigating incidents.

<u>Recommendation 18:</u> That the Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command consider applying a procedure in Police Communications Centres that ensures preference is given to using encrypted police radio rather than mobile phones to convey critical information to all attending police.

5.3.3 Intelligence and information sharing

As has been highlighted previously the use of intelligence and information sharing are an essential element in the prevention of critical incidents potentially leading to violent confrontations. However, when responding to incidents that have already occurred, best practice evidence indicates the importance of timely dissemination of succinct and accurate intelligence information to enhance situational awareness and a planned response by police.

Currently typical intelligence information provided for an unfolding critical incident is a name and address check being conducted in QPRIME by a PCC operator. This situation has arisen due to a number of factors; specifically the level of training provided to PCC operators in eliciting information from QPS data bases (which are complex, with information held in a diverse range of data bases) in conjunction with the need for operators to respond to other time-critical enquiries occurring simultaneously. The recent introduction of iPads to frontline officers has increased access to intelligence based information however the devices are still limited in terms of the level of detailed data they produce (for example full QPRIME reports cannot be accessed and address checks cannot be completed).

There are a number of intelligence officer positions within the QPS Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Major Events Command (ICMC) that are supplemented by station intelligence officers performing duties in police districts. The majority of these positions are situated in larger regional and metropolitan areas and are held by officers performing shift duties on a 24 hour, 7 day week roster. However, it has been identified by the review team that these specialist resources presently have very limited involvement in value-adding intelligence information to frontline police responses to critical incidents, and that intelligence officers typically only become involved or are made aware of incidents unfolding when contacted by District or Regional Duty Officers (DDO / RDO).

Intelligence Officers are trained to interrogate electronic holdings such as QPS databases, external law enforcement databases, other government departments and some private databases / mediums and identify and analyse critical information, intelligence officers should, wherever possible, play a greater role in QPS response to critical incidents to assist in planning and de-escalation strategies.

This was also felt by DDOs who responded to the review survey. Advice was provided that planned responses to critical incidents could be improved by having dedicated intelligence officers monitoring police radios to proactively develop and disseminate intelligence information to responding officers (through electronic resources such as iPads). Such information could include identification and analysis of offender criminal and personal antecedents, photographs of the offender, essential phone numbers (including on call negotiators), mental health history profiles, associates, social media posts and building floor plans

The review team interviewed the Assistant Commissioner ICMC and discussed the basic tenants that intelligence and information sharing are an essential element in the prevention and resolution of critical incidence. The Assistant Commissioner provided insights that intelligence officers have an analytical capability which allows intelligence gathered information to be predictive, however this must be balanced with QPS intelligence resources being finite. Whether PCC staff require enhanced training on information gathering or the analytical capability of intelligence officers is required to enhance QPS responses to violent confrontations is a body of work that requires further exploration.

<u>Recommendation 19:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Major Events Command collaborate with the Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command giving consideration to ways in which the level of operational support provided to officers responding to incidents may be enhanced through-

- exploring whether PCC staff require enhanced training on information gathering from computer holdings; and
- intelligence officers monitoring police radios, CAD or being embedded in Police Communication Centres to provide first responders with immediate access to intelligence gathered information.

The review team explored the integrated service delivery model used by New Zealand Police in their Communication Centres. The model has a tiered approach that includes intelligence capabilities embedded in their Communications Centres. Feedback was also provided to the review team that a trained negotiator currently stationed in Brisbane Police Communications Centre (BPCC) had been utilised to speak to people in crisis over the phone and has successfully diffused several incidences. If these intelligence and negotiator capabilities were embedded in BPCC there is potential for them to be of state-wide benefit QPS members.

<u>Recommendation 20:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Major Events Command and the Assistant Commissioner Community Contact collaborate with the Assistant Commissioner Operations Support Command (State Negotiator Unit) to explore a model to trial where negotiator and intelligence capabilities are embedded in BPCC to provide state-wide support 24/7.

During consultation the review team identified several DDO's and RDO's are utilising Tactical Incident Command iPad applications on their own private mobile devices to manage their planning approach to major incidents. These apps allow the Police Forward Commander to use satellite images of incident scenes and overlay them with icons marking cordon positions, offender locations and other important information as an incident unfolds. The images are able to be sent via SMS or email to other police on scene to share critical information in real time. The app also provides for the images to be recorded and later played in coronial/court proceedings, training scenarios or debriefings. The most commonly used app 'Tactical Police Table' is presently not available for use on QPS issued iPads. The QPS Incident Command Section is currently negotiating with the PSBA Frontline and Digital Services Division for this application to be included on the approved list of QPS downloadable apps. The review team supports the views held by the Incident Command Section and surveyed DDO's that the roll out of this simple and cost effective app will improve planning and allow for more effective information sharing amongst operational police at violent confrontations.

<u>Recommendation 21:</u> The General Manager Frontline Digital Services, PSBA direct work be undertaken to review and fast track the inclusion of the Tactical Police Table application on the approved list of downloadable apps for QPS issues iPads.

5.3.4 Police Call Centre Mental Health Clinician Initiative

As previously highlighted police are the primary agency where emergency calls for service and critical incidents are received (from the public and organisations including Lifeline and Kids Help Line); and are responsible for assessing and initiating service response. In an attempt to provide an integrated, cross-agency response to calls for service involving high risk mental health incidents, the QPS commenced an initiative in January 2015 involving the co-location of a Senior Mental Health Clinician

(SMHC) within the Brisbane PCC. The initiative involves a SMHC working in the BPCC during high demand periods on a flexible demand driven roster across both weekday and evening periods throughout the week. In addition to actual physical shifts, a Qld Mental Health on-call number is available for other periods by police state-wide. Supervisors and senior officers responsible for making police response decisions, can now seek advice on potential high risk incidents and alternative interventions from Queensland Health through the State Duty Officer at BPCC.

The initiative has been well received with both agencies, QPS and Queensland Health, viewing the partnership as providing an important critical information sharing arrangement with over 550 referrals undertaken (information sharing advice incidents) over the past six months, assisting officers to make better informed decisions in managing persons suffering or exhibiting mental health behaviours. Over 75% of incidents have involved reports of persons suffering from a mental illness (behaviour related); or attempting/threatening suicide.

Whilst this initiative falls within the reactive component of the QPS prevention and resolution model it also value-adds to the proactive side in that the SMHC and Queensland health are able to obtain an insight into the type and frequency of police contact with at-risk individuals, with police information providing a feedback circuit to individual Queensland health case files to facilitate preventative health care to those who may require ongoing assistance and/or case management (early intervention).

Considering these findings it can be seen that this initiative has the potential to provide an enhanced operational police response, improve officer safety and improve outcomes for persons suffering from mental health issues. Currently formal data relating to the full extent of the value added by the SMHC to outcomes is limited (given the initiative has only been in place for six months), however Queensland Health have undertaken to conduct an evaluation with assistance from the QPS in the second half of 2015. Findings from the evaluation will provide a strong evidence-base to inform future development / enhancement of the initiative.

<u>Recommendation 22:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command in partnership with Queensland Health coordinate a full evaluation of the BPCC / SMHC initiative and ensure findings from the evaluation are used to inform further initiative development.

5.3.5 Police Response Times

Contemporary best practice and training when responding to violent confrontations highlights the value of creating time, thinking and planning before arrival at any potential incident. The effective utilisation of time between the receipt of a call for service and arrival provides opportunity to develop situational awareness, plan the response and source specialist assistance. Commencing tactical assessments using COPS, POP and WIN prior to the attendance at violent confrontations is often crucial to the extent to which UOF can be minimised or avoided.

As part of its commitment to enhancing front-line services, the QPS has introduced an additional service standard that emergency job Code 1 (very urgent matters when danger to human life is imminent) and Code 2 (urgent matters involving injury or present threat of injury to person or property) are attended within a 12 minute timeframe by police. It is noted that the benchmark is measured by the time taken from the incident creation to the arrival of police at the incident.

This requirement appears to be in opposition to research and best practice, which maintain there is no direct evidence that a rapid police response to incidents has a positive impact on crime detection or prevention. Sherman (2012) maintains it is very rare that a police rapid response improves the likelihood of apprehending offenders and it is rarer still that a rapid response can save a crime victim from serious injury. Alpert (in Bialik, 2013) advises the important thing is what happens once police arrive at the scene; that getting there a few minutes or seconds early for most calls for service makes no difference. However the review has noted that the service standard relates only to the attendance at the scene within a 12 minute period. Police are to arrive and assess the scene and there is no time imperative to resolve the incident within that timeframe.

This is also evident in responses from the DDO survey which identified a range of time intensive processes that must be addressed by the PCC before police arrival at an incident. These include liaising with local shift supervisors to obtain latest intelligence, liaising with mental health staff from other agencies, examining criminal / mental health histories of subjects, contacting crews to provide advice or instructions, arranging further responders / specialist support and conducting a briefing at a pre-determined meeting point prior to arrival on scene.

A Victorian Police review (2009) identified a perception held by members that the public expect police to fix problems immediately and that this, coupled with a training regime concentrating on confrontation in incident resolution had led to a culture of 'must resolve quickly'. Anecdotal feedback from internal and external stakeholders identified that there may be a perception amongst some frontline police officers that QPS management require critical incidents to be resolved promptly to enable other calls for service to be addressed. However, it must be noted that in addressing this, the Commissioner has clearly articulated across the Service (via email and other messaging) the need for first responders to engage specialist response resources at the earliest opportunity to minimise the risk of a violent confrontation with police.

Further, it is incumbent upon senior managers, in line with the Commissioners expectations, to provide clear and consistent messages to subordinate officers about the resolution of violent confrontations. Ensuring that all officers understand the 12 minute response time relates only to the attendance at the scene to assess the incident. Supervisors should avoid placing restrictive time pressures on first responders and supervisors to resolve these incidents.

5.3.6 Operational supervision and leadership

By the very nature of general duties policing being the first limb of a reactive police response, the vast majority of police shooting incidents worldwide involve uniform patrol division police. In examining the breakdown of QPS police district experience levels, the review team identified that in some districts up to 60 per cent of all police officers possess less than six years overall policing experience. As such, operational supervision of frontline officers is an issue of key importance when considering police response to violent confrontations.

International policing research identifies that having a supervisor at the scene can help avoid a tendency to think action must be taken immediately to resolve the situation (PERF, 2012). This same research identified that a number of policing agencies have developed a practice of mandating the attendance of a supervisor and at least two patrol units to high risk calls (and preferably a dog squad unit). This practice allows for a planned response based on supervisor observations, and improved safety for both police and the person in crisis.

These findings are supported by the results of the review DDO survey, wherein 98 per cent of respondents identified the presence of a DDO or shift supervisor as being a contributing factor influencing positive outcomes for critical incidents. However, it is relevant to note that in the same survey 78 per cent of respondents advised they are not always made aware of calls for service to potential critical incidents.

DDOs offer operational frontline supervision in that they are mobile, in the field officers with the capacity to respond quickly to calls for service for violent confrontations. However under the current resource model, DDOs are not allocated to all police divisions and districts across the State. In the absence of DDOs, responsibility for frontline supervision lies with the shift supervisor.

Analysis of relevant sections of QPS policy, procedure and human resource documentation found that whilst the role of the DDO and RDO in relation to supervision, particularly for violent confrontations and UOF is sufficiently clear in policy, the role of shift supervisor as outlined in section 1.4 of the OPM - Duties and Responsibilities of Officers - appears largely administrative.

Internal QPS research (2011) explored the different supervision contexts of on-road versus in-station supervision and found that despite an expectation from shift supervisors and subordinate officers that

supervisors should 'lead from the front', the reality was that supervision needs were challenged by human resourcing constraints and station administrative demands.

Importantly, this research found a statistically significant difference between how subordinate officers perceived the operational supervisory effectiveness between the two groups, with less than half (41%) of officers supervised by an in-house shift supervisor rating their effectiveness at a high level. When asked to rank their confidence in their supervisor's ability to police high-risk or emergency situations only 62 per cent of those whose supervisor was situated in a police station ranked their ability as high or very high. In contrast, 88 per cent of officers whose supervisor was on the road ranked their ability as high or very high.

Analysis of relevant PSBA human resource material of police officers found anomalies which give further weight to these findings. When comparing the position description of a general duties senior constable (GDO04) and a general duties sergeant - shift supervisor (GDO05) there is no difference in the key accountabilities - they are identical. Considering the sergeant role is a designated supervisory position it seems remiss that supervision is not included as one of the key accountabilities / duties to be undertaken. In addition, whilst the individual capability profile for a senior constable specifically indicates the need to 'provide guidance and supervision', there is no mention of supervision in the sergeant profile.

Considering the role played by supervisors in the mentoring and development of subordinate officers generally, and the importance of frontline supervision in relation to UOF and critical incidents, there needs to be increased strategic focus on the tasking and resource allocation of shift supervisors across the Service to ensure the QPS is compliant with best practice.

<u>Recommendation 23:</u> The Deputy Commissioner, Regional Operations in partnership with the Executive Director, Human Resources PSBA direct work be undertaken to-

- determine and clearly articulate QPS requirements of shift supervisors specifically including reference to planning and managing the response to violent confrontations in the relevant position descriptions and key accountabilities; and
- ensure the requirements are reinforced through clear messaging across the QPS.

5.4 Other Issues

In conducting this review a few additional issues of relevance emerged; issues that relate to the QPS management of, and response to UOF, and a broader applicability to operational police service delivery and performance.

5.4.1 Use of Force (UOF) reporting:

As previously outlined data relating to critical incidents and UOF is not centrally stored or recorded in a distinct system within the QPS. Section 1.6.1 of the OPM outlines the requirement for officers to record operational information, however the systems used are disparate being patrol logs found on ITAS. IMS, QCAD and QPRIME. Each of these systems vary in their accessibility and search applications and some do not have the ability to interface with one another. In addition, current reporting requirements are overly onerous, often taking up to 40 minutes of officer time to complete.

Specific UOF reporting requirements are outlined in an appendix to section 14.8 of the OPM, however not all UOF incidents meet the necessary threshold to require reporting on. Therefore incidents or confrontations that are resolved without injury or by the use of presence, open or closed hand tactics and communication and do not meet the threshold are not captured in the formal UOF reporting system.

Whilst the QPS has UOF data collection and monitoring systems in place (SEMS and SERP) as these only capture UOF at the reportable level, they are unable to provide stakeholders accurate and complete data. As a result, the review has been unable to make an evidence based finding of the status of Queensland police officers UOF, including whether or not there is a culture of over-reliance on the use of accoutrements to resolve incidents (as opposed to less confrontational options).

Given findings from national and international policing reviews and that the current Australia New Zealand Police Use of Force Principles (Appendix E) articulate the need for agencies to collect comprehensive data across the range of UOF options, it will be necessary for the QPS to explore options to enhance data collection to present a more holistic UOF picture. In doing so, the Service needs to give consideration how best to use UOF data for performance measurement and welfare assessment of officers. For example there is currently no system which is able to identify officers who routinely de-escalate incidents, who may be seen as exemplars of UOF best practice. Conversely, there is no way currently to identify officers who may be over exposed to violent confrontations that do not meet existing UOF reporting requirements, but who may be in need of support or assistance.

During discussions with senior officers from the QPS Ethical Standards Command and representatives from the QCCC it was agreed that QPRIME should be the central UOF data collection system and that further there is scope to utilise job codes on QCAD as a way of simplifying UOF reporting.

A recent (2014) internal QPS review of SERP and interviews with the Assistant Commissioners from ESC and OCC found that the SERP process should be revitalised to promote ongoing review and consistency in the collection of data. Essential to this is the expansion of the role of the SERP Secretariat to incorporate an intelligence and research component as a means of identifying best practice.

<u>Recommendation 24</u>: The Assistant Commissioner Ethical Standards Command and Assistant Commissioner Community Contact Command in conjunction with the Chief Information Officer PSBA direct work be undertaken to enhance organisational data systems to enable simplistic and comprehensive use of force data collection including-

 a review of how communications room operators could utilise the QCAD and QPRIME interfaces to record all Situational Use of Force options employed by police and the level of subject resistance (for example weapons possessed) including matters resolved without injury or current non-reportable use of force.

5.4.2 Operational Research and Advisory Section

The QPS values continuous learning and strives to provide services underpinned by a strong evidence base. Historically, the provision of strategic and operational research and evaluation was primarily the responsibility of two specialist units of the QPS; the Review and Evaluation Unit, Ethical Standards Command and the Operational Research and Advisory Unit (ORAU), Operations Support Command. As part of the restructure of emergency services both these units transitioned to PSBA in 2013, at which time the Review and Evaluation Unit was disbanded, with researchers being reallocated to other work duties across the agency. The ORAU was relocated to PSBA Training and Education and renamed the Operational Research Advisory Section (ORAS).

Historically, the ORAS comprised a permanent staff of four and was able to draw on additional specialist resources if needed for projects. The role of ORAS was to research, trial, evaluate and provide quality advice to the senior executive on matters relating to use of force equipment and associated items (for example replacement of the Service rifle, load bearing vests, spit hoods and weapon holsters). Members of ORAU also held positions on various QPS committees including the Corporate Health and Safety Coordinating Committee and the Significant Events Review Panel (SERP).

Whilst the role of ORAS remains the same, reduced resourcing (currently staffed by one officer) and a lack of direct linkage to the QPS senior executive concerning approval and procurement of equipment

has seen a degradation in the ability of ORAS to effectively perform much of its intended function; primarily focusing on projects involving procurement of new police equipment (such as weapons, weapon holsters etc.). Whilst having no capacity to affect staffing changes, in an attempt to improve visibility of ORAS functions the QPS Program Management Office, OCC instigated a process to overview ORAS project procedures in February 2015.

Taking into account the loss of the Review and Evaluation Unit function (comprising a manager and eight civilian researchers) and the reduced capacity of the ORAS, it is evident there has been a significant diminution in the research and evaluation capacity available to the QPS, negatively impacting our ability to ensure operational policing services are delivered within a best practice, evidence based framework. This situation conflicts with the ANZPAA Use of Force Principles and current government directives that policy and service delivery be evidence based and that evaluation is a key component of performance measurement. As such, it is essential that increased operational research and evaluation capacity is provided to the QPS, and that the ORAS function is more closely aligned with the QPS Program Management Office, OCC given the strong linkage between its research and evaluation role, equipment procurement and expenditure.

It was identified that the Litigation Unit (LU) is the central PSBA management point for all QPS common law work cover claims, significant and complex litigation matters. LU's primary responsibility is to receive, assess, investigate and monitor claims. Upon finalisation of matters, the unit provides advice to management on risks, administrative and operational issues to minimise legal action against the organisation, its members and to improve Workplace Health and Safety (WPHS).

The LU also aims to assist continually improving workplace practices and procedures by performing an educational role within the organisation minimising the potential for civil consequences from employee claims for injuries sustained during their employment. The review team interviewed a member of LU, who identified that upon finalisation of a claim information is sent to the QPS Chief OSTT instructor for consideration of inclusion in curriculum. At present there is no overarching governance process relating to UOF information that corrals the relevant information from various sources including LU and then makes recommendations to the QPS Chief OSTT instructor.

<u>Recommendation 25:</u> The Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command in consultation with the General Manager Human Resources, PSBA give consideration to-

- relocating operational research and evaluation section (ORAS) functions to the QPS; and
- ORAS developing an overarching governance process to deal with Coroners recommendations, issues arising from critical debriefings, issues identified from workplace incidents, injuries both physical & psychological as well as issues from the current SERP process to inform curriculum development processes.

5.4.3 Active armed offenders

Following the 1999 Columbine High School massacre in the United States, police response to Active Armed Offender (AAO) incidents changed and policies and practices evolved. Incidents involving an AAO, perhaps more than any other, impose extreme stress on responding police officers. Analysis of 84 AAO incidents in the United States found they are typically over in a matter of minutes, resulting in death or injury of multiple victims and best practice highlights the importance of training and planning in responding to AAO incidents (PERF, 2014). Much of the national and international literature is American based and focuses on 'active shooters' and defines the person as one who armed only with a firearm(s).

The review team obtained advice from a visiting FBI representative who expressed the importance of defining this category of offender in policy, agreeing that the definition of AAO should be explored as it included a person armed with other potentially lethal weapons.

In 2013/14 the QPS Security, Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) conducted four counter terrorism training scenarios titled Exercise Duplo. The Exercise Duplo series were held at the Townsville,

Cairns, Whitsundays and Gold Coast. The CTG identified a series consistent issues relating to incident command during the commission of the exercises. The findings of the series included:

• adapting the ICENRIRE approach outlined in s.1.12.7 of the OPM to reflect a more situational approach and in addition with a standard plan for AAO's;

• amending s.17.3.7: 'Tactically Dangerous Situations' of the OPM to include that forward commanders should deploy intelligence officers as early as possible to the police forward command post;

• incorporating tactical leadership by junior officers into QPS Incident Command doctrine (i.e. via Incident Command Development Unit (ICDU) training and through Operational Skills and Tactics training by the Operational Skills Section); and

• incorporating a security element (i.e. physical and information security) to the QPS ICS methodology and in s.1.12.7 of the OPM.

A body of work, underpinned by the exploration of best practice of training relating to AAO in other jurisdictions is currently being progressed within the QPS. Findings from this review and the Exercise Duplo series should be incorporated into this ongoing body of work, including the integrated response model outlined in Appendix B. As previously outlined in Figure 4 it is also crucial that policy is developed to provide an underpinning framework on which the curriculum is developed.

In considering the development of policy or additional inclusions in OSTT training and curriculum, it should be acknowledged that an AAO incident is a highly specific type of incident that police may face and that such incidents are statistically rare in Australia, with recent research indicating that the last 'active shooter' incident in Australia occurred in 2002 at Monash University (Hodgins & Saliba, 2015). Norris (2013) also indicates that any policy and procedural changes made to existing UOF or command and control doctrines in Australian jurisdictions should not replace existing containment and negotiation strategies, which should still be used in the majority of high risk situations.

<u>Recommendation 26:</u> That the Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command and the Assistant Commissioner Intelligence Counter Terrorism and Major Events in conjunction with the Executive Officer Education and Training, PSBA ensure-

- that policy is developed, including a definition of AAO to underpin the curriculum, training and responses to AAO incidents; and
- the current body of work is underpinned by an evidence-base of national and international best practice and includes the appropriate components ICENRIRE, the integrated response model in Appendix B of this report and the learnings from Exercise Duplo.

5.4.4 Continuous improvement

The QPS as an organisation has a strong commitment to continuous improvement. The QPS Strategic Plan 2014 - 2018 outlines as one if its key objectives that it will

implement an environment of continuous improvement based on learning, development and empowered leadership'.

In addition to officer and staff personal and professional development, the Service continues to develop programs, projects initiatives and operational trials across the organisation to enhance service delivery to the community. The establishment of Operational Capability Command (OCC) to support the Deputy Commissioner (Strategy, Policy and Performance) has been a key initiative to best position the QPS on organisational improvement. The Program Management Office (PMO) within OCC supports QPS management and program / project managers by monitoring, performing quality assurance and reporting of QPS programs and projects to a range of internal and external governance boards and committees.

The review team engaged with the PMO to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the breadth of relevant bodies of work relating to UOF currently being undertaken across the Service, in addition to those key initiatives already mentioned in the body of this report³. Illustrated in Appendix F, it can clearly be seen that the QPS commitment to continuous improvement is strong, with projects / trials in place to enhance our response to and prevention of, violent confrontations.

5.4.5 **Performance framework**

The literature review identified there should be expanded efforts by Law Enforcement Agencies to collect and analyse data including deaths and near misses (President's Task Force, 2015). Accordingly the review examined the diverse systems currently used by the QPS to record, monitor and review police UOF. In order to identify current recording and governance processes the review team interviewed members of Operational Capability Command, Community Contact Command, Ethical Standards Command, Education and Training and sought data from Statistical Services relevant corporate holdings such as ITAS, QPRIME, CSS, Significant Event Messaging System, and QCAD.

The review team found that QPS policy, procedure, practice and training is influenced by the ability of the organisation to imbed findings and insights from its own successes and learnings, International, National and interstate jurisdictions, academic research and coronial recommendations. The ANZPAA Use of Force Principles (Appendix E) provide that policing organisations should maintain appropriate UOF governance structures. Currently the QPS uses a combination of SERP, Complaints (from CSS holdings), Q-Prime and the Divisional Performance Model (DPM) as a strategic performance framework to monitor UOF trends.

DPM has four pillars- engaging with community, preventing and solving crime, increasing public safety and efficient utilisation of resources. Capturing a more holistic view of QPS use of force should also identify changes in the culture, any emerging response practices and both positive and negative officer performance issues. Operational Capability Command is currently developing the QPS Performance Framework and it is proposed that performance measures relating to Case and Place Strategies and UOF monitoring are included in the framework. The current SERP process could then evolve into the Performance Framework in the fullness of time.

<u>Recommendation 27:</u> That the Assistant Commissioner Operational Capability Command collaborate with the Assistant Commissioner Ethical Standards Command to consider-

- including the identification, measurement and exploration of use of force trends in the QPS Performance Framework (including current SERP functions);
- and <u>in the interim</u>
- expanding the role of the SERP QCC Secretariat to include the performance monitoring of the resolution of all violent confrontations; and
- the integration of an intelligence and research capacity into the SERP Secretariat function.

<u>Recommendation 28:</u> That the Deputy Commissioner Strategy, Policy and Performance consider which QPS area will own the responsibility for UOF monitoring at a strategic level.

5.4.6 OSTT Expert advice and evidence

³ It should be noted that many of these projects, trials and initiatives were commenced independently of this review, reflective of the organisations long term commitment to continuous improvement

Staff from the Operational Skills Training Unit are regarded as the QPS experts on OST, in that capacity they provide written opinion and oral testimony appearing on behalf of the QPS in Courts of Law, Coronial Inquests, Work Cover matters and civil complaints against the Service. The review has highlighted that curriculum development and training are separate processes. Therefore there is a distinction to be made between the evidence provided by the OST Unit on police operational skills training and the evidence that relates to curriculum doctrine and governance.

<u>Recommendation 29:</u> The Executive Officer Education and Training, PSBA in conjunction with the Assistant Commissioner Ethical Standards Command establish the parameters for written and oral expert evidence to be provided by the OST unit, including-

- that the OST expert should only provide evidence on Operational Skills and Tactics Training; and
- that the QPS curriculum doctrine should be provided by a suitable Senior QPS member representing the Commissioner of Police.

5.4.7 Operations Support Command initiatives

Operations Support Command (OSC) is currently trialling two initiatives that have the potential to impact positively on the outcome of violent confrontations that require a police response.

Mobility Response Capability Initiative

The Mobility Response Capability (MRC) is essentially similar to the Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT) used in Victoria. CIRT team members dress in fire retardant padded clothing, use small team tactics and utilise less lethal options including riot shields, pepper ball, and mass gas they can be deployed in a first response capacity. The United Kingdom also have similar capabilities with the secondary crews having access to extra lethal options as there first response police are unarmed.

The MRC trial commenced in the Brisbane Region at in July 2015 operating in identified peak times to provide greater less lethal responses to violent confrontations. The proposal is narrow in its scope in that it will only engage the Public Safety Response Team (PSRT) on a trial basis in the Brisbane Region. The goal of the initiative is to test aspects of agility and flexibility in the PSRT service delivery.

Under this initiative MRC are deploying in small teams of four with extra less lethal options such as crowd control shields, pepper ball, larger capsicum spray capability, ballistic helmets and crowd control armour. These less lethal options provide additional support and alternatives to resolving violent confrontations without resorting to the use of lethal force.

The review obtained the initiative proposal documents that identified the MRC are to be deployed primarily as a defensive platform. The author of the initiative proposal was interviewed and he cited a key lesson learnt from the Victorian CIRT model was to ensure the capability does not evolve into a quasi-Police Tactical Group (PTG). A recent Victorian evaluation had found this evolution had occurred in their CIRT thereby making it a less effective model for peaceful resolutions.

The review explored the potential for a wider implementation of the MRC model across the state. It was identified that all Tactical Crime Squad (TCS) officers were given the extra less lethal training and equipment in preparation for G20. Those officers are current in their training and have the resources to deploy in this capacity if approved. However feedback was provided that the deployment of specialist teams can potentially diminish the skills of general duties police who are often the primary responders to violent confrontations and that consideration should be given to upskilling all police with extra less lethal options and equipment.

<u>Recommendation 30:</u> The Assistant Commissioner of Operations Support Command cause an evaluation of the Mobility Response Capability initiative to establish if it has a broader application for first response police across the QPS.

Hot Hatch Release for K9 Initiative

The 'Hot Hatch or quick release' for police dogs is based around a pod or latch system attached to a police vehicle. The premise behind the system is the 'quick release' of a police dog from a vehicle into a tactical dangerous situation or in response to an assault police incident. The police dog can respond at a moment's notice to resolve an incident, stop the continuation of any offence or prevent assault to a police officer. The dog is released from either the back of a police vehicle or from a police dog transport vehicle by the handler, by depressing a button on a key chain, police officer's belt or inside the front cabin of a police vehicle.

The review was informed that the initiative is an evidence based approach and that the research conducted by OSC identified that there are two types of release systems-

1) A 'hinge' activated device, which opens the rear door of a police vehicle (as in the USA) of a police cruiser. This release mechanism is completed by the handler either activating a 'button' on a key chain or a button situation inside the vehicle. The rear door 'pops' open and the dog is deployed.

2) A 'hinge activated device which 'pops' a pod door open from the rear tray/canopy of a police vehicle. This type is currently utilised in Australia/NZ by the Western Australian Police Force and New Zealand Police Service as well as military working dogs units deployed to Tier (1) units (specialist military units around Australia). This is the preferred method in Australia. The release system is similar to number (1) activation.

OSC also provided the review with the results of trials conducted by US and Western Australian based dog units providing both the positive and negative aspects to the Hot Hatch release system-

Positives:

- Quick release of a Police Dog to an incident
- Quick release of a Police Dog when a Police Dog Handler is being assaulted or needs to deescalate a volatile situation where assault or there is a life endangering threat to life.
- Quick release of a Police Dog to stop the continuation of serious offences

Negatives

- Lack of control of Police Dog once it's released from vehicle. Trials in US have shown that police dogs released during traffic stops have been run over during 'hot hatch' deployments.
- Lack of control once Police Dog is deployed from vehicle, especially from the rear of the vehicle if threat exists behind the vehicle. (Accurate target identification)
- Handler and/or equipment error where batteries are not replaced in key chain release system or equipment is not maintained to an operational standard and/or limited training or clear instructions in use of system.

The QPS currently has one Hot Hatch release system being utilised by the Cairns Dog Squad with approval granted for the development of a second pod.

5.4.8 Ongoing monitoring of review recommendations

<u>Recommendation 31:</u> The Commissioner appoint a Senior Responsible Officer to work in consultation with stakeholders including relevant unions and other agencies to overview and monitor implementation of the review recommendations.

Appendices

Appendix A - Bibliography

Appendix B - Response Model

Appendix C - Process Map

Appendix D - Life Cycle

Appendix E - UOF ANZPAA

Appendix F - PMO Table

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
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
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
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2015 Operational Skills and Tactics Training for Police Officers



DRAFT – CALL FOR SERVICE OR ENGAGEMENT LIFECYCLE



AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND POLICE USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLES

These principles do not override Australian or New Zealand police use of force related legislation or operational procedures or policies in jurisdictions

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Use of force by police officers includes any situation where, in the execution of their duty, police use physical force or other techniques, including a weapon, instrument or implement to respond to an actual or perceived threat.

KEY PRINCIPLES

AUTHORITY

 The authority to use force is derived from the law. Individual police are accountable and responsible for their use of force and must be able to justify their actions at law.

ACCOUNTABILITY

 Police should only use force that is reasonable, necessary, proportionate and appropriate to the circumstances. Police should use no more force than is reasonably necessary for the safe and effective performance of their duties.

UNDERPINNING PRINCIPLES

TRAINING AND SAFETY

Police organisations should:

- use a situational model to guide police in operational decision making
- provide police with regular skill and knowledge development and equipment to safely and effectively respond to potential use of force incidents
- make support services available to police involved in use of force incidents.

POLICY

Police organisations should:

- emphasise the importance of effective communication and conflict resolution skills as the preferred means to resolve incidents
- provide guidance to police to manage risks associated with the use of force including how risk might apply to vulnerable persons
- promote cross jurisdictional cooperation in the pursuit of continuous improvement in the area of operational safety.

MONITORING

Police organisations should:

 maintain governance structures to report, record, monitor and evaluate the use of force to improve public and police safety.

Relevant QPS PMO projects

Project Name	Project Aim- Ongoing bodies of work
Performance Framework	The QPS Corporate Dashboard will present data from key
Program:	operational and functional areas, such as performance including
	how to measure responses to repeat calls for service and
	preventative measures.
QPS Benchmarking	The QPS benchmarking project seeks to identify and set
	contemporary internal and external KPI's and measures to use as a
	reference point to understanding the effectiveness and efficiency
	of the QPS.
Tackling Alcohol and Drug	Continue to Implement the Government policy tackling Alcohol
fuelled Violence- including QPS	and Drug fuelled Violence including the monitoring of Safe Night
Safe Night Out Strategy	Out Precincts which continues to address alcohol fuelled violence.
Intelligence Capability	Review of the Intelligence, Counter Terrorism and Major Events
	Command across all intelligence based functions within the
	Command and throughout the QPS. Establish an information
	sharing process between regulatory authorities.
Review of Violent	Review QPS policy, procedures and training on resolution of
Confrontations	violent confrontations and comparison to best practice
	from other jurisdictions
Taser Replacement Project	Concerning cost and replacement of the QPS X26 Taser, which will
	no longer be manufactured after December 2014.
Firearms Review Project	The need to assess the benefits for a WMLS for QPS issue weapons
(Formerly Weapons Mounted	as a result of the shooting of DSC Damien Leeding. The assessment
Light Source)	is to include the all the operational, financial and training issues.
Referral Services (Supportlink)	To evaluate the effectiveness, value for money, and explore the
	options for an alternative referral management solution.
Public Safety Communications	Review of Communications Centres within the QPS and across the
	Public Safety Portfolio. Informed by Blueprint and whole of
	Portfolio review.
Secure Data Centre	Project to establish a Secure Data Centre within Griffith University
	providing a means to access Queensland Police data including
	statistical information, providing a gateway for academia.
Police Intervention Initiative	Develop and implement Police Intervention (PI) Initiatives to
	prioritise and target certain offending in Brisbane, Gold Coast,
	Beenleigh, Ipswich, Townsville, Cairns, Rockhampton, Redcliffe
	and Sunshine Coast, under a case and place management
	approach involving partnerships between Prosecution Corps,
	Operational Police and Community stakeholders to enhance the
	prosecution, health and social responses to reduce crime and
	repeat calls for service.
Mental Health Bill-	Once enacted, The Mental Health Bill may provide a greater range
	of statutory options to police and the criminal courts. Once
	enacted this project will address resource implications for the QPS
	regarding the development and modification of education and

Project Name Project Aim- Ongoing bodies of work		
	training packages, QPS policies and practice guidelines, and any	
	required upgrades to information management systems for	
	mental health incidents and case management.	
Government Wireless Network	GWN is a multi-agency to provide an encrypted communication	
(GWN)	network for Emergency Services. The GWN will be fully	
	implemented in the South-East corner well before Commonwealth	
	Games in 2018.	
Mobile Services	The establishment of a managed service that includes delivery of	
(Q-Lite)	1250 mobile devices and to commence the expansion beyond its	
	current capacity as well as allowing the development of 13 key	
	mobile applications.	
Prosecutions Technology	Develop and implement technological enhancements in the	
	prosecution process; and where relevant enhance the quality of	
	the prosecutorial response, the provision of services to clients and	
	the integration of other Criminal Justice stakeholder responses.	
Body Worn Video (BWV)	Use of Body Worn Video (BWV) within QPS, current trial	
	underway.	
Project Booyah	Prevention Strategy for identified disenfranchised youth.	
	Establishment within Community Contact Command (CCC),	
	creation of temporary Police positions to facilitate a state-wide 2	
	year trial commencing in 2015.	
DV Task Force	This project will address resource implications for the QPS	
Recommendations	regarding the DV Task Force Recommendations.	

Relevant Drug and Alcohol Co-Ordination Unit Initiatives

Current/recent Initiatives	Aims/Outcomes
Drug and Alcohol	Working with Far North Queensland Northern Regional Drug
Coordination Unit (DACU)	Squad, Northern Territory Police and West Australian Police to
	develop practical means of identifying the incidence and level of
	ICE use in discrete communities in the 'top end' of Australia.
Drug and Alcohol	Developed information bulletins for regional police dealing with
Coordination Unit (DACU)	people under the influence of stimulant drugs, including ice.
Legislative amendment	Addition of an offence (April 2013) for Trafficking in Relevant
	Substances (controlled precursor chemicals) – section 9D Drugs
	Misuse Act 1986 (20 years imprisonment
State Drug Squad: Chemical	Delivery of awareness sessions to pharmacy students and
Diversion Desk	pharmacists regarding the appropriate sale of pseudoephedrine to
	customers, to reduce available of illicit manufacturing of
	methamphetamines.
QPS Representative on the	The IGCD is currently engaged in a consultation process for the
Inter-Governmental	development of the 2016-2021 National Drug Strategy.
Committee on Drugs (IGCD)	
Operational Police	Awareness session with operational police regarding interaction
Awareness: Drug and Serious	with drug affected individuals, clandestine laboratories awareness
Crime Group	and advice relating to the investigation of supply, manufacture of
	illicit drugs.
Operation Greensmoke	2013 National Drug Strategy Law Enforcement Funding
	Committee (NDSLEFC) project to provide education and
	awareness about new synthetic drugs to mining, resources and
	associated community groups. This platform also provided an
	opportunity to discuss methyl amphetamine use in these sectors.
Clandestine Laboratory	Aimed at enhancing community awareness of clandestine
Awareness (CLAWS) Project	laboratories and encourages reporting activities in relation to
	possible 'amphetamine production sites.
Police Intervention (PI)	A QPS renewal program that enhances frontline services and the
Initiative	implementation of appropriate case and place management
	strategies to respond to crime. Exploring a PI initiative to target
	ICE incorporating early intervention, enhanced enforcement and
	prosecution.
Representative at the	The QJMG coordinates and focuses multi-agency responses on
Queensland Joint	issues such as seizure of assets, targeting of facilitators used by
Management Group (QJMG)	crime groups responsible for importing, producing and
	distributing illicit substances.
Future Initiatives	Aims/Outcomes
DACU Community Awareness	A community based awareness package on illicit drugs (including
(Building on the NDSLEFC	ICE) to be distributed and delivered at local levels by regional and
funded 'Green Smoke''	district police to community groups. Purpose is to increase
Project)	community awareness around illicit drugs and increase reporting
	on drug related crime.